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Exempting High-Level Employees
and Small Employers from
Legislation Invalidating Predispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements
E. Gary Spitko·
On February 12, 2009, lawmakers in the u.s. House of Representatives
introduced the "Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009. " This bill, if enacted, will 
invalidate any predispute arbitration agreement between an employer and
its employee. Last year, the 110th Congress considered the narrower
"Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act of 2008," which would have
invalidated such predispute arbitration agreements if they required
"arbitration of a dispute arising under" federal civil rights laws. This
Article explores how best to structure any such invalidation of predispute
employment arbitration agreements, both in light of the rationales for and
against regulation of the employment relationship generally, and in light of 
the rationales for and against regulation of employment arbitration
agreements specifically. Any legislation invalidating predispute
employment arbitration agreements should be complete as to subject matter
and cover both statutory employment discrimination claims as well as state
common law employment claims. Moreover, any such legislation should
exemptfrom its coverage claims by or against certain high-level employees
and claims by or against certain small employers. This Article proposes an
exemption for high-level employees that borrows and modifies concepts
from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Family and Medical
Leave Act, and the National Labor Relations Act. Further, this Article
proposes an exemption for small employers that borrows and modifies
conceptsfrom Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 USc. § 1981a. 
• Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. A.B., Cornell
University; J .D. ,  Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to Sarah Rudolph Cole,
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Stephen J. Ware, and participants in the 2009 Labor and
Employment Relations Association Annual Meeting for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article, and to William Logan for his research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1991, the Supreme Court held in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp. that employee claims brought under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA" ) may be the subjects of valid predispute
arbitration agreements.! In Gilmer, the Court began its analysis by
I Gilmer v. Interstate(johnson Lane Corp. , 500 U .S. 20, 23 (1991). Arbitration
resulting from predispute arbitration agreements that are required as a condition of
employment is frequently referred to as "mandatory arbitration." See, e.g. , Theodore J. 
St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It's Better than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. ] .L.
REFORM 783, 783 (2008) (using term "mandatory arbitration" to mean "that
employees must agree as a condition of employment to arbitrate all legal disputes with
their employer, including statutory claims, rather than take them to court") .  I agree
with Professor Richard Speidel, however, that the use of " [ t lhe phrase 'mandatory
arbitration' [in this contextl is misleading because it connotes arbitration that is
compelled by law regardless of consent." See Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration
of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute (Mandatory) Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (1998); see also IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION 
LAw § 2:36 n.5 (1995) (commenting that use of term "mandatory arbitration" to
describe arbitration resulting from predispute arbitration agreements "is extremely
confUSing language because it ignores altogether the consensual element in contracts"
and "its usage resolves linguistically the issues of the reality of consent and the effect
to be given to consent by fiat, rather than by analysis revealing the nature of the
issues"); Stephen ]. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State
Constitutional Jury-Trial Rights, 38 U.s.F. L. REV. 39, 40-44 (2003) (arguing that
" [al rbitration is not mandatory when it arises out of a contract, because contracts are
formed voluntarily"). While such an arbitration agreement is a contract of adhesion
offered on a take it or leave it basis, the employee still has the choice to avoid the duty
to arbitrate by declining the offer of employment. Id. at 42. In this Article, therefore, I
refrain from using the term "mandatory arbitration. " Rather, with apologies, I employ
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594 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
asserting that "statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration
agreement, enforceable pursuant to the [Federal Arbitration Act] . ,, 2
Therefore, the party seeking to avoid arbitration of the ADEA claim
bore the burden of demonstrating that Congress intended to preclude
arbitration of ADEA claims.3 One may find congressional intent to
preclude arbitration of a statutory claim in the particular statute's text
or legislative history or in light of an "inherent conflict" between the
statute's purposes and arbitration of claims arising under the statute.4 
The plaintiff in Gilmer conceded that neither the ADEA's text nor its
legislative history evidenced a congressional intent to preclude
arbitration of ADEA claims.5 Moreover, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs argument that arbitration of age discrimination claims was
inconsistent with the ADEA's purposes or structure.6 In a critical
passage, the Court reasoned that an agreement to arbitrate an ADEA
claim is not a waiver of substantive rights, but merely an agreement to
resolve claims arising from those rights "in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum."7 The Court concluded that "so long as the
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve
both its remedial and deterrent function. ,,8
Lower courts subsequently applied Gilmer's framework and
reasoning to hold that claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act ("Title VII,, )9 and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA,, )lO may also be the subjects of valid predispute arbitration
agreements.ll Consequently, employers have with much greater
the admittedly cumbersome description "arbitration arising from a predispute
employment arbitration agreement."
2 Gilmer, 500 U.s. at 26.
3 Id. (stating that " [a) lthough all statutory claims may not be appropriate for
arbitration, ' [hJaving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it
unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue' " (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.s. 614 , 628 (1985))).
4 Id.; ShearsoniAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.s. 220, 227 ( 1 987).
5 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. 
6 Id. at 27-32.
7 Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.s. 614, 628 (1985)).
8 Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U .s. 614,  628 (1985)).
9 42 U.s.c. § §  2000e-2000e-1 7  (2006).
10 42 U.s.c. §§ 121 1 1-121 1 7  (2006).II See, e.g., EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 749-50
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (ADA and Title VII); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 595
frequency entered into predispute arbitration agreements with their
employees. 1 2  Indeed, many employers now insist that their employees
enter into such agreements as a condition of employment. 13
Critics of arbitration ansmg from predispute employment
arbitration agreements are legion. 14 Their concerns and criticisms have
Fenner &: Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 ,  7 (1st Cir. 1999) (Title VII); Koveleskie v. SBC
Capital Mkts. ,  Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 368 (7th Cir. 1999) (Title VII).
12 See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. 
RTS. &: EMP. POL'y J. 189, 189 ( 1997) [hereinafter Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect] 
(citing to studies that provide evidence of increase between 1991 and 1995 in number
of employers using predispute employment arbitration agreements) ;  Lisa B. Bingham,
On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of 
Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 225 (1998) [hereinafter
Bingham, Adhesive Contracts] (asserting that " [ t] he use of employment arbitration
began to accelerate dramatically after the United States Supreme Court decided
Gilmer"); Alexander J.5. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity
Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 1 1  EMP. RTS. &: EMP. POL'y J. 405, 4 1 1  (2007) (reviewing
empirical studies and concluding that " [a]lthough there are limitations to the existing
studies, they do show a consistent pattern of Significant expansion of employment
arbitration in the decade and a half since the Gilmer decision" and hypotheSizing that
"employment arbitration is likely already a more widespread system for governing
employment relations than collective bargaining and labor arbitration") ;  Elizabeth
Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DISP. RESOL. J. ,  May-July
2003, at 10 (citing author's interview with American Arbitration Association vice
president in support of assertion that "between 1997 and 200 1 ,  the number of
employees covered by employment arbitration plans administered by the AAA grew
from 3 to 6 million").
13 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-MOST PRIVATE­
SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, GAOIHEHS-95-150 
Appendix II at 28 ( 1 995) (indicating that thirty-nine percent of employers who
reported using arbitration as method of dispute resolution reported that their policy to
use arbitration was "mandatory for all"); Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New 
Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039,
1041 (1998) (asserting that " [e] mployers now subject millions of their employees to
[predispute employment arbitration] agreements") ;  Stephen J. Ware, Employment
Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 100 ( 1996) [hereinafter
Ware, Voluntary Consent] ("Since Gilmer, it appears that more employers have begun
to insist upon arbitration agreements as a condition of employment.") .
14 See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64
UMKC L. REV. 449, 470 (1996) (arguing that "pre-dispute arbitration agreements
between parties with disparate negotiating incentives should not be enforced");
Haagen, supra note 13, at 1068 (proposing to require that "the party who wishes to
compel arbitration [must] demonstrate either that genuine bargaining occurred, or
that the arbitral procedures provided for are equitable and calculated to vindicate the
parties' legal rights");  Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the 
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 701 ( 1996)
(arguing that " [t ]o the extent that the Supreme Court refuses to recognize that
unregulated mandatory binding arbitration agreements can be detrimental to
   
        
   
  
     
    
 
  
   
 
  
  
 
     
  
     
   
  
  
  
  
   
 
 
 
    
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
  
   
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
      
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
    
  
 
  
  
  
  
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
   
  
   
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
  
  
 
 
 
   
   
   
 
  
 
  
   
   
 
   
  
 
    
 
  
  
  
       
    
 
 
   
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
        
    
 
     
     
       
           
         
     
     
        
      
        
         
    
          
         
              
           
         
        
       
        
        
          
    
            
         
        
            
         
          
          
        
      
         
                
            
           
          
         
           
              
             
              
          
         
            
        
596 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
focused on the bargaining power advantage that employers generally
have with respect to employees, and on features of arbitration - such
as often very limited discovery - that might make it more difficult for
an employee to successfully assert a claim against his employer. Critics
also have argued that because of its private nature, arbitration is a less
effective means than litigation to serve the public interests grounding
employment discrimination statutes. IS In light of these asserted
inadequacies and inequities of arbitration arising from predispute
employment arbitration agreements, critics have called on Congress to
amend the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 16 to prohibit enforcement
of predispute employment arbitration agreements, at least with respect
to civil rights claims. 17
consumers, employees, and other little guys, Congress should step in to protect their
interests"); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017,  
1 050 (1996) [hereinafter Stone, Yellow Dog Contract) (arguing that " [b)y subjecting
employment rights to a regime of private justice and cowboy arbitrations, we are
eliminating most employment rights for most American workers") ;  see also EEOC
Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 133, at E-4 Quly
1 1 ,  1997) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Statement) (setting forth basis for EEOC's position
that "agreements that mandate binding arbitration of discrimination claims as a
condition of employment are contrary to the fundamental principles evinced in [the
nation's employment discrimination) laws") .  
The term "employment arbitration" refers t o  arbitration arising out o f  a contract
between an employer and an individual employee. Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of 
Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 
OHIO ST. J .  ON DISP. RESOL. 735, 737 (2000-2001 )  [hereinafter Ware, The Effects of 
Gilmer). In contrast, the term "labor arbitration" refers to arbitration ariSing out of a
collective bargaining agreement entered into between an employer and a union. Id. 
This Article is concerned with issues relating to employment arbitration.
15 See infra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
16 9 U.s.c. §§ 1-16 (2006).
17 See, e.g., Leona Green, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes:
A Public Policy Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS &: PUB.
POL'y 173, 223-25 (1998) (endorsing Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1997,
which would have made void any predispute employment arbitration agreement as it
pertained to rights ariSing under various federal employment statutes, and proposing
additional legislative protections with respect to post-dispute employment arbitration
agreements and any arbitration conducted pursuant to such agreement) ; Stone, Yellow
Dog Contract, supra note 14, at 1 050 (calling on Congress to "expressly repudiate the
result of the Gilmer case" and "ensure that binding arbitration agreements are not
made a condition of employment") ;  cf JOHN T. DUNLOP, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, U.s. 
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
("DUNLOP COMMISSION") ,  FINAL REPORT 59 ( 1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION
REPORT) (calling on Congress to pass legislation that would forbid making agreement
to arbitrate public law claims condition of employment).
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 597
Indeed, in light of Gilmer and its progeny, since the mid- 1990s,
Congress has repeatedly considered legislation that would prohibit
enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements insofar as they relate
to employment discrimination claims and other federal employment
statutes. For example, the proposed Preservation of Civil Rights
Protections Act of 2008 provided that "any clause of any agreement
between an employer and an employee that requires arbitration of a
dispute arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States
shall not be enforceable." IB The proposed act, however, expressly
would not have affected any arbitration agreement entered into after a
dispute had arisen, or any arbitration agreement contained in a valid
collective bargaining agreement. 19 Further, by limiting coverage to
disputes "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States,"
the proposed act would not have affected arbitration agreements
relating to state common law claims, such as wrongful discharge.
Earlier bills proposed similar employment arbitration limitations by
expressly amending various federal civil rights and accommodation
statutes to invalidate predispute arbitration agreements relating to 
claims arising under these statutes.20 For example, the proposed Civil
Rights Procedures Protection Act of 2001 ,  similar to a series of earlier
bills, would have amended Title VII , the ADEA, the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, the ADA, 42 U.s .c. § 198 1 ,  the equal pay requirements under
18 H.R. 5 1 29, S. 2554, l lOth Congo § 423 (2008). The 2008 proposed legislation
mirrored earlier proposed legislation. See Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act
of 2005, H.R. 2969, 109th Congo (2005) (proposing that "any clause of any agreement
between an employer and an employee that requires arbitration of a dispute arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States shall not be enforceable");
Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act of 2004, H.R. 3809, S. 2088, 108th Congo 
(2004); Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act of 2002, S. 2435, 107th Congo 
(2002); Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act of 200 1 ,  H.R. 2282, 107th Congo 
(2001) .  
19 H.R. 5 1 29, S .  2554, § 423(b) ( 1 )-(2).
20 See Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 200 1 ,  S. 163, H.R. 1489, 1 07th
Congo (2001 )  (proposing to invalidate predispute employment arbitration agreements
affecting civil rights claims); Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1999, S. 121 ,  
H.R. 872, 106th Congo (1999) (same); Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1997,
S. 63, 105th Congo ( 1997) (same); Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1996,
H.R. 983, 1 05th Congo (1996) (same); Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1996,
H.R. 3748, 104th Congo (1996) (same); Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of
1995, S. 366, 104th Congo (1995) (same) ; Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of
1994, S. 2405, H.R. 4981 ,  103d Congo (1994) (same); cJ. Protection From Coercive
Employment Agreements Act, S. 2012, 103d Congo (1994) (proposing to make it
unlawful employment practice for employer to discriminate against applicant or
employee because individual refuses to agree to submit employment discrimination
claim to "mandatory arbitration").
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598 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43 :591 
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") , and the Family and Medical
Leave Act ("FMLA") "to prevent the involuntary application of
arbitration to claims that arise from unlawful employment
discrimination . . . .  "21 Like the Preservation of Civil Rights Protections
Act of 2008, this proposed act and similar earlier bills would not have
affected state common law claims arising from the employment
relationship.
Much more sweeping in scope is the proposed Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2009 as introduced in the House of Representatives in February
2009.22 This bill provides that " [n lo predispute arbitration agreement
shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of ( 1 )  an
employment, consumer, or franchise dispute; or (2) a dispute arising
under any statute intended to protect civil rights."23 On its face, the
proposed Arbitration Fairness Act will invalidate predispute
arbitration agreements as they relate to state common law claims and
will apply regardless of the actual bargaining power of the employee
relative to the employer.24 Its findings suggest that the bill's sponsors
were concerned with the inequality of bargaining power between
employers and employees and with the lack of meaningful choice and
the potential for unfair arbitration procedures attendant to such
inequality. Additionally, the findings indicate dissatisfaction with the
lack of transparency in arbitration and the retarding effect that
arbitration purportedly has on the development of public law.2s 
In light of the November 2008 election of President Obama and
greater Democratic majorities in both the u.S. House of
21 s.  1 63 ,  H.R. 1489.
22 H.R. 1020, l I l th Congo (2009). A substantially similar bill, with slightly
different wording, was introduced in the Senate on April 29, 2009. See Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, I l l th Congo (2009) (proposing that "no predispute
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an
employment, consumer, franchise, or civil rights dispute").  
23 H.R. 1020 § 4. The bill is similar to but more limited than the proposed
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, which would have prOvided that " [nlo predispute
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of (1)  an
employment, consumer, or franchise dispute; or (2) a dispute arising under any
statute intended to protect civil rights or to regulate contracts or transactions between
parties of unequal bargaining power." H.R. 3010, S. 1782, I lOth Congo § 4 (2007)
(emphasis added) .
24 The bill defines "employment dispute" as "a dispute between an employer and
employee arising out of the relationship of employer and employee as defined by the
Fair Labor Standards Act." H.R. 1020, l I l th Congo § 3 (6) (2009); cJ. S. 93 1 ,  l I lth
Congo § 3 (a) (2009) (defining "employment dispute" as "a dispute between an
employer and employee ariSing out of the relationship of employer and employee as
defined in section 3 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938") .
25 H.R. 1020, S. 93 1 ,  1 1 1th Congo § 2 (2009).
  
   
  
    
     
 
  
     
  
  
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
  
 
   
  
   
    
   
 
  
    
  
   
   
    
    
  
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
  
   
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
   
 
  
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
   
  
    
  
 
 
  
 
 
     
   
  
 
  
  
    
  
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
 
  
    
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
   
  
  
   
 
 
    
 
  
 
  
   
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
        
   
         
        
 
 
  
   
 
  
      
          
      
   
         
       
    
        
       
         
     
     
     
         
       
           
        
        
      
       
        
       
       
        
               
    
           
              
         
       
          
          
           
           
           
         
             
          
              
      
2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 599
Representatives and the Senate, the prospect of an amendment to the
FAA invalidating at least some predispute employment arbitration
agreements would seem much greater.26 This Article explores how best
to structure such legislation.27 Specifically, this Article considers
whether legislation invalidating these arbitration agreements should
apply to statutory employment claims but not to state common law
employment claims, and whether this legislation should apply to all
employers and with respect to all employees.
Part I begins by considering the rationales for and against regulation
of the employment relationship generally, and regulation of
employment arbitration agreements specifically. In light of these
rationales, the remainder of this Article considers how best to
structure a proposed statute prohibiting enforcement of predispute
employment arbitration agreements. Part II considers the soundness of
invalidating predispute arbitration agreements as they relate to 
statutory employment law claims while not invalidating such
agreements with respect to common law employment law claims. Part
III explores whether it is appropriate in structuring an employment
arbitration restriction to distinguish between high-level employees and
low-level employees and, if so, how to best distinguish between those
employees who should be within the restriction and those who should
fall outside it. Specifically, this Part examines how Congress has
distinguished between high-level and low-level employees in several
federal employment statutes: the ADEA's exemptions for "bona fide 
executives" and "high policymaking employees" with respect to the
ADEA's age discrimination prohibition as it relates to forced
retirement; the FMLA's exemption concerning certain highly
compensated employees with respect to the FMLA's reinstatement
26 See Michael Fox, It's Not EFCA, Now It's FAN, JOTTINGS BY AN EMPLOYER'S LAw.,
Apr, 24, 2009, http://employerslawyer.blogspoLcoml2009_04_01_archive.html
(concluding that "odds are in favor of [the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009's]
passage");  Bob Lian, The Potential Impact of the Obama Administration on the Labor and
Employment Landscape, WASH. LAB. &: EMP. WIRE, Nov. 5, 200S,
http://washlaborwire.coml200S/l l/05 (discussing potential impact of November 200S
federal elections on workplace legislation and regulation and predicting that
"President-elect Obama will likely support this dramatic overhaul of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) if it is reintroduced in the l l l th Congress") .
27 For an argument against any legislation prohibiting enforcement of adhesive
predispute arbitration agreements, see Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing
Adhesive Arbitration Agreements - With Particular Consideration of Class Actions and
Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 25 1 ,  264 (2006) [hereinafter Ware, Adhesive Arbitration
Agreements] (arguing that "the general enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements
benefits society as a whole by reducing process costs and, in particular, benefits most
consumers, employees and other adhering parties").
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requirement for employees who take FMLA leave; and the National
Labor Relations Act's ("NLRA") exclusion of "supervisors" from the
collective bargaining protections of the NLRA. Part III borrows
concepts from each of these statutes to craft an exemption for high­
level employees from any legislation invalidating predispute
employment arbitration agreements. Finally, Part IV considers
whether small employers should be exempt from any legislation
prohibiting enforcement of predispute employment arbitration
agreements and, if so, how best to structure such an exemption.
In sum, this Article concludes that the legislation pending in
Congress to invalidate certain predispute employment arbitration
agreements is too broad. Any legislation invalidating these arbitration
agreements should be complete as to subject matter; that is, it should
cover both statutory discrimination claims and common law and
contract claims. Such legislation, however, should exempt claims by or
against certain high-level employees and claims by or against certain
small employers.
l. RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP GENERALLY AND OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS SPECIFICALLY
In conSidering how best to structure any legislation invalidating
predispute employment arbitration agreements, this Article is
concerned principally with three variables: ( 1 )  whether the
invalidation should apply only to statutory claims or also should apply
to state common law claims; (2) whether the invalidation should apply
regardless of the worker's position with the employer; and (3) whether
the invalidation should apply regardless of the employer'S size. This
Article seeks to evaluate choices relating to these issues in light of the
purposes of employment regulation generally, and in light of the
commonly asserted justifications for regulating employment
arbitration agreements specifically. The overarching inquiry of this
Article is whether the costs of regulation outweigh its benefits. 28 This
Part sketches out the rationales for and against regulating the
employment relationship and the justifications for and against
regulating employment arbitration. The remainder of this Article
applies these rationales to the issues under consideration to best
28 See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & GILLIAN LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAw 12 (2008) ("In
sum, the operation of the law may serve as a barrier to, rather than facilitator of,
efficient allocation. For this reason, it is critical to assess whether the benefits justify
the costs of [employmentl regulation.").
  
  
   
    
 
  
 
  
    
  
   
   
  
  
   
 
  
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
   
  
 
   
 
   
 
  
   
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
 
 
   
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
   
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
   
  
   
   
   
 
    
     
  
    
  
 
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
   
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
        
       
     
  
         
 
       
      
      
      
        
   
        
 
 
       
      
 
   
       
          
       
              
         
   
         
        
             
             
           
          
            
            
   
                
               
                 
            
            
            
        
               
             
          
             
     
               
          
2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 60 1
structure a statute prohibiting enforcement of predispute employment
arbitration agreements.
A. Rationales for and Against Regulation of the Employment
Relationship
l. Reasons for Regulating the Employment Relationship
There are three commonly asserted rationales for regulating the
employment relationship that are arguably very pertinent to a
proposed statute invalidating predispute employment arbitration
agreements. First, some employment regulation seeks to prevent gross
exploitation of workers that might otherwise exist in light of the
bargaining power advantage that most employers have with respect to
most employees.29 A mandate that employers pay a minimum wage is
an example of this kind of regulation.3D Arguably, such regulation
benefits not only employees but also employers and society as a whole.
This view regards "regulation as a means to promote social cohesion
- to enhance the leverage of weaker groups so that they will have
more of a stake in the society, and thus to channel conflict over the
distribution of wealth into less socially destructive avenues than
outright industrial warfare."31
Second, a related but distinct rationale for regulating the
employment relationship concerns correcting for "market failures. "32
29 See Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law: Reflecting or
Refracting Market Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29, 47-48 (2001) (asserting that "much of
employment law uses [the rhetoric of 'unequal bargaining power'] and related
concepts of 'protecting the little guy' and 'preventing employer exploitation' as
rationales for intervention" in employment relationship). But see id. at 47 (arguing
that "unequal bargaining power is not a market failure" and "is not by itself an
argument for regulation").
30 ESTREICHER &: LESTER, supra note 28, at 6 ("Regulation, in the form of, say, laws
mandating the provision of minimum or 'living' wages, may be viewed as a way of
enhancing the returns to work so as to conform to some ideal of the terms that would
have been reached if individuals did not have to bargain under necessitous
circumstances. ") ; Schwab, supra note 29, at 33-34 (noting that minimum wage laws
"are commonly explained as reactions to the harshness of unregulated markets, which
would allow workers to work for near-starvation wages").
31 EST REICHER &: LESTER, supra note 28, at 6; Stone, Yellow Dog Contract, supra
note 14, at 1043 (commenting that "statutory employment rights are enacted when a
legislature believes that workers cannot adequately protect themselves simply by
bargaining with their employers. That is, they reflect a legislature'S view of market
failure in the contracting process.") .  
32 ESTREICHER &: LESTER, supra note 28,  at 7-10; Haagen, supra note 13,  at 1059-60
(arguing that because "choices between arbitration and litigation are likely
   
          
         
    
   
   
    
       
        
 
 
        
         
  
    
  
 
   
       
   
        
   
       
 
   
 
           
   
 
      
   
      
   
      
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
 
               
           
  
          
 
    
  
    
             
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
       
          
 
        
   
         
  
          
     
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
          
    
 
        
 
      
           
         
        
        
       
         
 
        
       
      
  
 
   
         
        
           
       
  
 
     
       
        
   
             
  
       
      
 
       
           
      
      
        
   
             
      
       
        
       
      
       
   
         
  
  
            
       
  
               
    
 
602 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
These market failures or market inefficiencies might be caused by such
things as employers with excessive market power, the presence of
external costs or benefits, employers' and employees' incomplete
knowledge or information, practical limitations on employee mobility,
transaction costs relating to negotiation of individual employment
contracts, or management obj ectives that do not seek to maximize
profi ts.33 An example of an employment regulation that seeks to
correct for market failure would be the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration's ("OSHA")  regulations setting forth employer
safety record-keeping requirements.34 According to standard economic
theory, if an employer has a relatively unsafe workplace, the employer
will have to pay its workers relatively more to compensate them for 
the extra risk to their health and safety.35 This risk premium will serve
as an incentive to the employer to reduce workplace health and safety
risks at its worksite.36 This scenario breaks down, however, when one
considers the cost and difficulty that employees and j ob applicants
have in obtaining information about the safety records of various
employers.37 Thus, OSHA's record-keeping and access regulations
"may . . .  be justified as an attempt to correct this market failure in
information. "38
Third, another widely accepted rationale for regulation of the
employment relationship is norm transformation and reinforcement.39 
Statutes that proscribe invidious employment discrimination, such as
systematically to be made by at least one of the parties on the basis of no information,
inadequate information or misinformation, and . . .  one party to the transaction is
likely to know that," a market ineffiCiency arises that justifies requiring "the party
seeking to impose a mandatory arbitration agreement[] to provide reliable information
to the party being asked to give up the right to go to court") .  
3 3  See also Cole, supra note 1 4 ,  at 474-76, 482-83 (arguing against enforcing
certain executory employment arbitration agreements in light of employers'
bargaining advantage, employees' information deficiencies, and transaction costs
relating to negotiating individual employment contracts) ;  Schwab, supra note 29, at 35
(citing collective goods problems and asymmetric-information problems as examples
of market failures that prevent employer from offering benefit to workers even though
those workers value benefit more than it costs employer) . See generally ESTREICHER &: 
LESTER, supra note 28, at 8- 1 0.
34 ESTREICHER &: LESTER, supra note 28, at 210 .  
35 ld. 
36 ld. 
37 ld. (commenting that " [ i ] f  there is asymmetrical access to information, the
hazard premium may be set too low or not at all"). 
38 ld. 
39 ld. at 7 ("Another argument for regulation is that it provides a means whereby
society seeks to implement its value system, its notion of the fair conditions under
which people may be employed.") .
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 603
Title VII and the ADEA, are prime examples of such employment
regulations. Employment discrimination statutes seek not only to
protect workers from discrimination in specific cases, but also seek to
prevent harm to society as a whole by teaching and reinforcing that
certain forms of employment discrimi nation are inconsistent with
society's core values.4O 
2. Rationales Militating Against Regulating the Employment
Relationship
There are two general concerns that one should keep in mind when
evaluating the merits of any employment regulation. First, the
regulation may directly or indirectly raise the cost to employers of
doing business. For example, the FLSA requirement that an employer
provide its employees a certain minimum wage or pay certain
employees overtime for hours worked in excess of forty hours per
week might raise the employer's labor costS.41 Regulation might also
impose indirect costs on the employer, such as the expenses an
employer would need to incur to become suff iciently knowledgeable
about the regulation to achieve compliance or the costs an employer
might incur while defending litigation that challenges the employer's
efforts to comply.42 In response to these increased costs, the employer
might pay its workers less, hire fewer workers (or more workers, to
40 See generally Nan D. Hunter, Lawyering for Social Justice, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1009, 1012 (1997) (arguing that although 1964 Civil Rights Act was culture-shifting
for South at time of its enactment, it became culture-shifting for nation as whole
primarily because of judiCial interpretation); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: 
Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, 72 N .Y.U. L. REV. 967, 975 ( 1 997)
(arguing that " [a l t least in part because of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - the most
important statutory embodiment of the ideal of racial justice - American culture,
American government, and the American people have absorbed the concepts of
equality and integration embodied in the Act as the proper ethical framework for the
resolution of issues of race") .  
41 See ESTREICHER & LESTER, supra note 28, a t  10 ("A common objection to
employment regulation is that regulation may raise the marginal cost of labor beyond
its marginal contribution to the value of the firm's product or service and is therefore
equivalent to an exogenous wage increase over the equilibrium wage.") .  
42 See Papa v. Katy Indus. ,  Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting
congressional awareness of and concern with "the potentially crushing expense [ for
small employersl of mastering the intricacies of the antidiscrimination laws,
establishing procedures to assure compliance, and defending against suits when efforts
at compliance fail") ;  DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17,  at 49 (noting that
"aside from the direct costs of [employmentl litigation, employers often dedicate
Significant sums to designing defensive personnel practices (with the help of lawyers)
to minimize their litigation exposure") .  
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604 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
avoid paying overtime) , or pass the cost along to its customers,43 Thus,
employment regulation might make employers subject to the
regulation less competitive relative to employers not subj ect to the
regulation,44
Second, a related but distinct concern is that employment regulation
often benefits one set of workers at the expense of another set of
workers or at the expense of consumers.45 Consider, for example,
raising the minimum wage. Incumbent employees who were earning
below the newly mandated minimum wage and who retain their
employment will benefit from the increased minimum wage.46 To the
extent that the increase in minimum wage causes employers to hire
fewer workers, however, the workers who are not hired at any wage
lose OUt.47 This redistribution or distortion in the market may be
particularly troubling when the winners are those who already were
relatively well off and who benefit at the expense of those workers or
consumers who were relatively less well off,48 or when a relatively few
workers benefit at the expense of many,49
43 ESTREICHER & LESTER, supra note 28, at 10- 1 1 ;  Ware, The Effects of Gilmer, supra 
note 14, at 742 (asserting that " [wl ith respect to universal employment mandates like
Social Security, available data confirms the economic model's prediction that much,
but not all, of the mandate's cost is paid by employees in the form of lower wages");  
DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17 ,  at 49 ("These costs [of employment
litigation and efforts to minimize employment litigation exposure) tend to affect
compensation: as the firm's employment law expenses grow, less resources are
available to provide wage and benefits to workers.") .  
44 See Schwab, supra note 29, at 34 (predicting that in response to trends in labor
markets, such as globalization, employment regulation in future will focus more on
need for employers and economies to remain competitive) .
45 ESTREICHER & LESTER, supra note 28, at 10- 1 1  ("The costs [of exogenous wage
increases) are borne by those who cannot obtain jobs and, to the extent output (either
quantity or quality) is reduced to meet increased labor costs, consumers.") ;  Ware, The 
Effects of Gilmer, supra note 14, at 744-46 (explicating how and when "targeted
employment mandates [such as the ADA's accommodation mandate) redistribute from
employees outside the protected class to those in the protected class").  
46 See EST REICHER & LESTER, supra note 28, at 10 (noting that even those workers
who seem to benefit directly from employment regulation "might prefer to trade away
the statutory entitlements (e.g. , a safer workplace or paid family leave) for other goods
such as higher wages").  
47 Id. at 10- 1 1 .  
48 Id. a t  1 1 .  
49 See Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
Claims, 72 N.Y.U. l. REV. 1344, 1357 ( 1 997) [hereinafter Estreicher, Predispute
Agreements) (describing "downside" to jury trials and present "employment law
landscape" and concluding "we have a system in which a few individuals in protected
classes win a lottery of sorts, while others queue up in the administrative agencies and
face reduced employment opportunities") ; cf. Schwab, supra note 29, at 34
  
    
 
  
    
  
 
    
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
   
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
   
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
  
 
 
    
 
  
    
  
 
  
   
 
    
  
 
 
   
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
    
 
 
  
 
  
 
   
  
 
 
 
  
   
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
   
    
 
 
   
   
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
    
    
 
  
 
   
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
    
  
  
 
   
     
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
  
  
  
   
 
 
  
    
   
   
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
        
        
         
  
     
      
      
       
         
 
 
   
          
 
       
         
        
 
           
           
             
             
           
         
             
              
           
            
             
        
              
         
             
        
  
             
               
                
          
           
              
  
        
             
               
              
          
            
            
             
            
2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 605
B. Rationalesfor and Against Regulation of Predispute Employment
Arbitration Agreements
1. Virtues of Employm ent Arbitration
The virtues of employment arbitration include the virtues of
arbitration generally.50 Arbitration of an employment dispute offers the
promise of a more informed, timely, economical, and private
resolution of the dispute as contrasted with adjudication of that
dispute in court.51 First, the parties to an employment arbitration can
contract to select a decision maker with expertise in employment law
matters.52 Arguably, this allows for a more informed and predictable
decision on the merits and, importantly, a decision that the parties
would accept as being more informed and, therefore, legitimate.53 
("Increasingly lawmakers will respond to the idea that good employment laws are
those that help labor markets produce the largest pie. It is unfair to intervene in labor
markets to assist some while hindering others, if that shrinks the overall pie.").  
Professors Estreicher and Lester also point out a third concern raised by some
employment regulation: "Regulation may also have the effect of 'crowding out'
beneficial behavior that parties would engage in in the absence of regulation."
ESTREICHER & LESTER, supra note 28, at 12. For example, an employer that might
otherwise consider adopting a leave policy that is in some ways more generous than
the FMLA requires might be discouraged from doing so by the administrative
complications that would arise from having a leave policy that differs from the one
that the FMLA mandates. See TiMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL. , EMPLOYMENT LAw: PRIVATE
ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 686 (2007) (suggesting that lawyer drafting employer's
leave policy to ensure compliance with FMLA should attempt to draft policy that is
"both legal and administrable by the Human Resources Department") .  
5 0  See generally Cole, supra note 14, a t  455-57 (discussing virtues o f  arbitration,
including expert decisionmaking, flexible procedures, confidentiality, and limited
judicial review) .
51 See David Sherwyn et aI., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in
the Process, 2 U .  PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 100 (1999) [hereinafter Sherwyn et aI. ,
Mandatory Arbitration] ("For employers, the reduced cost, increased speed, private
nature, and elimination of juries make arbitration an attractive option."). But see
Haagen, supra note 13, at 1053 (pointing out that arbitration can be "slow, expensive,
and cumbersome").
52 See Cole, supra note 14, at 455. 
53 See Edward Brunet, The Core Values of Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAw IN 
AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 3 , 13 (Edward Brunet et ai. eds. ,  2006) ("Trust of the
expert arbitrator is essential to support the concept of finality. " ) ; cf. W. Mark C.  
Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the Empirical Study
of Employment Arbitration, 4 1  U. MICH. J .L. REFORM 843, 866 (2008) (suggesting that
" [u ] nlike judges, arbitrators can be selected for their sensitivity to local context,
which might plausibly make them superior to courts at tailoring public norms to
specific workplaces, not to mention better able to identify or create workplace-specific
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Second, for several reasons, the parties will likely resolve an
employment dispute in less time and with less expense in arbitration
than in court.54 Arbitration allows the disputants to avoid the long line
of litigants awaiting their turn for a trial in court.55 Moreover,
arbitration typically provides for only limited discovery56 and is less
formal relative to civil litigation in court.57 Finally, an arbitral decision
is subject to only extremely limited judicial review58 and, therefore, is
less likely to be appealed than a trial court decision.
The speed, economy, and informality of arbitration may be
especially valuable in the employment context. The expeditious and
less formal resolution of the employment dispute may help to preserve
a ben eficial employment relationship that might otherwise have been
irreparably harmed during protracted litigation.59 It also might reduce
norms in areas not governed by external law").  
54 See Colvin, supra note 12,  at 425-26 (reviewing earlier empirical studies and
reporting on his own empirical study and concluding that empirical research supports
conclusion that " [a ]n advantage of [employment] arbitration compared to litigation . .  
. is the relatively speedy time to hearing and a final decision in arbitration cases"); 
David Sherwyn et ai. , Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for
Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1564 (2005) [hereinafter Sherwyn et ai. ,  
Assessing the Case] (evaluating empirical studies on employment arbitration and
concluding that "arbitration provides a quicker resolution than litigation"); Ware,
Adhesive Arbitration Agreements, supra note 27, at 287 ("When compared with
litigation, most arbitration proceedings streamline the entire process: pleadings,
discovery, motion practice, trial or hearing, and appeal ! ,  resulting] in less lawyer time
spent on a case and thus lower legal fees.") ;  Weidemaier, supra note 53, at 846-47
(reviewing empirical studies and, although cautioning about problems arising when
comparing "the relative merits of arbitration versus the courts," concluding that "the
clearest area of research relates to disposition times and demonstrates that arbitrators
resolve disputes much more quickly than courts") .
55 See DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17 ,  at 55 (reporting Dunlop
Commission's finding that "employees bringing public law claims in court must
endure long waiting periods as governing agencies and the overburdened court system
struggle to find time to properly investigate and hear the complaint") .  
56 Brunet, supra note 53, a t  2 0  (asserting that " [lJ imited discovery i s  a n  important
general characteristic of arbitration") .
57 Id. at 17 ("Arbitration has responded to the undue formality and delay
associated with rules of evidence by essentially barring the use of formal rules of
evidence at arbitration hearings.").
58 See 9 U.5.c. § 10 (2006) (setting forth grounds for vacating arbitrator's
decision); see also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 93 1 ,  954-55 (1999) [hereinafter
Stone, Rustic Justice] (discussing "narrow standard of judicial review of arbitral
awards" under FAA and asserting that arbitral awards reviewed under FAA are
"virtually bulletproof') .
59 See Samuel Estreicher, Satums for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 564
   
 
   
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
   
 
  
 
   
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
   
  
    
 
  
 
 
     
 
 
  
  
   
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
   
 
   
 
    
  
   
  
  
 
   
  
 
   
 
   
     
 
   
 
    
  
  
  
  
   
   
 
   
 
  
 
 
     
  
   
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
   
  
  
   
 
  
   
  
    
  
  
  
 
  
   
 
   
  
  
      
  
  
   
   
    
  
   
   
   
   
     
  
   
      
  
  
  
   
    
  
 
      
    
   
  
   
     
  
   
 
  
     
  
 
 
 
   
  
      
 
  
  
     
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
    
 
   
   
 
  
   
    
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
   
   
  
   
  
 
   
 
  
  
  
   
   
  
   
  
   
  
   
 
  
  
 
  
  
   
 
  
   
  
  
   
 
 
 
   
 
  
   
 
   
   
        
    
         
       
 
        
       
           
     
        
             
           
        
      
      
          
        
            
          
           
         
             
         
           
    
         
       
       
      
             
         
        
           
          
        
          
      
         
       
                 
   
        
        
      
           
        
     
        
     
2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 607
the disruption to the workplace and limit the psychological or
emotional toll on coworkers attendant to protracted employment
litigation.60 Finally, the relatively lower monetary cost of arbitration
coupled with arbitration's informal nature allows and encourages
some employees who otherwise would not be able to bring a claim
against their employer to do SO.61 
(2001) [ hereinafter Estreicher, Satums for Rickshawsl (arguing that "unlike litigation
where resolutions often come too late and the process itself is so divisive that
reinstatement is rarely practicable, arbitration holds out the promise of a prompt
resolution more suitable for claims by incumbent employees or even former
employees truly desiring reinstatement") ;  Susan A. Fitzgibbon, Teaching 
Unconscionability Through Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Claims, 44 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 140 1 ,  1408 (2000) ("The informal, less adversarial aspects of the arbitration
process especially contribute to the possibility of maintaining a continuing
relationship between the parties to the dispute and the process may have a therapeutic
effect on the parties.") ; id. at 1413 ("An arbitration procedure that finally resolves
cases relatively quickly (compared with judicial resolution) offers employees a more
realistic opportunity for reinstatement. "); cf. DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
17, at 56 (concluding that "the litigation model of dispute resolution seems to be
dominated by 'ex-employee' complainants, indicating that the litigation system is less
useful to employees who need redress for legitimate complaints, but also wish to
remain in their current jobs").
60 Cf. Rachel H. Yarkon, Note, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawyers: Negotiated 
Settlement of Gender Discrimination Claims Arising from Termination of Employment, 2
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 165, 1 70 (1997) ("The fact that the delay of trial is likely to
exacerbate bad feelings is another incentive for early settlement."). 
6 1  See Fitzgibbon, supra note 59, at 1 4 1 2 (concluding that " [blased on experience
in labor arbitration, pro se representation may also be used more effectively and with
fewer risks than in court because of the more informal nature of arbitration") ;  Robert
A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public Law Disputes,
1995 U .  ILL. L. REV. 635, 651-52 (asserting that "the savings in time and expense that
arbitration brings may allow an employee to pursue claims that he or she would
otherwise be reluctant or unable to press"); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the
Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 40 1 ,  445
(1999) (noting that "arbitration is the only viable forum for certain employees because
it generally offers affordable and expeditious resolution of claims"); Sherwyn et aI. ,
Assessing the Case, supra note 54, at 1 575 (concluding that "it is easier for a pro se
plaintiff to prosecute his or her claim in arbitration than in litigation" in part because
of arbitration's informal nature) ; St. Antoine, supra note 1 ,  at 791-92 (asserting that
for employees with low-value claims, "the cheaper, Simpler process of arbitration is
the most feasible recourse" because " [i l t  will cost a lawyer far less time and effort to 
take a case to arbitration [andl at worst, claimants can represent themselves . . .  in this
much less formal and intimidating forum") .  But cf. Sherwyn et aI., Assessing the Case,
supra note 54, at 1580 (arguing that lower costs and privacy typically associated with
employment arbitration will encourage employers to defend suits they believe to be
baseless rather than settle them for nominal amount).
   
 
   
 
    
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
    
  
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
   
 
   
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
  
 
   
 
 
  
 
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
        
 
    
 
 
      
      
    
   
 
      
        
      
        
      
         
       
     
      
           
 
        
        
      
 
  
         
         
         
 
         
          
       
              
  
                
             
            
            
             
          
            
            
            
              
          
 
              
           
         
   
        
        
608 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:59 1
Third, arbitration, unlike civil litigation in court, is private.62 
Arbitration of an employment dispute, therefore, allows for resolution
of the dispute without the public disclosure of embarrassing, sensitive,
or confidential information that the employee, employer, or coworkers
would rather keep private.63 For example, the salary and performance
evaluations of a claimant and his coworkers might be relevant to the
claimant's discrimination claim and, therefore, might be both
discoverable and admissible in a hearing in litigation pertaining to that
claim. The employer, the claimant, and the coworkers will likely want
to maintain the privacy of this information. Arbitration of the
employment dispute provides for a greater likelihood of doing so.
2. Vices of Employment Arbitration
Critics of employment arbitration assert that it risks impairing the
interests of the employee and those of society to an unacceptable
degree.64 With respect to the employee's interests, critics focus on two
broad concerns. The first concern is that the structure and procedures
typical of arbitration tend to favor the employer.65 The second concern
is that employers typically enjoy informational and bargaining power
advantages over their employees, and they might use these advantages
to impose an arbitration process that favors the employer even more.66 
With respect to society's interests, critics of employment arbitration
argue that it does not serve the public goals of employment
discrimination law as well as public adjudication does.
62 Brunet, supra note 53, at 8 (describing how " [p lrivacy and secrecy pervade the
arbitration process").
63 See id. (commenting that " [t l he last thing a restaurant chain or a bank needs is
a public airing of dirty linen involving allegations of discrimination" and asserting that
" [ t l he desire for secrecy can be a prime determinant in selecting arbitration"); Lewis
L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 29, 42-43 (1998) (noting that employees may prefer privacy typically
associated with arbitration given that " [ml any employment cases involve matters
which are highly sensitive to the employee-plaintiff') ; Yarkon, supra note 60, at 186-
87 (noting several reasons why employee may value privacy of settlement, including
fact that judicial resolution of dispute might "require publication of the intimate
details of her life," and also noting that "employers may wish to avoid the negative
publicity associated with litigation to protect supplier, consumer, and employee
relations").
64 See infra notes 67- 1 03 and accompanying text. For a discussion and critique of
many of the criticisms of employment arbitration arising from a predispute
employment arbitration agreement, see Estreicher, Predispute Agreements, supra note
49, at 1352-59.
65 See infra notes 67-81 and accompanying text.
66 See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 609
a. Structural and Procedural Concerns
Addressing arbitration's structure and procedures, critics worry that
many of the distinctive attributes of arbitration might make it more
difficult for employees to successfully assert claims against their
employers.67 This fear is articulated in three structural and procedure­
based criticisms. First, costs unique to arbitration, such as arbitrators'
fees, might make it prohibitively expensive for some employees to 
vindicate their rights against their employers or, at best, will provide a
strong disincentive for the employee to assert such rights.68 Courts
have reacted to this criticism in a variety of ways. Some courts have
held that arbitration agreements required as a condition of
employment are not valid with respect to statutory claims unless the
employer agrees to pay all of the arbitrator's fees.69 Other courts have
held that such agreements are not per se invalid but that the employee
may avoid the obligation to arbitrate by demonstrating the likelihood
that arbitral costs and fees would substantially deter him from
enforcing his statutory rights.70 
67 See, e.g., GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw: VISIONS OF 
EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 55 (2d ed. 2007) ("As a procedural matter, the
concern is that the simpler and less costly procedures typical of arbitration will work
systematically to the disadvantage of plaintiffs .") .  
68 For a recent review of empirical studies concerning arbitration costs and
accessibility, see Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility:
Empirical Evidence, 4 1  U.  MICH. ],L. REFORM 813 (2008). But see Ware, Adhesive
Arbitration Agreements, supra note 27, at 287-88 (arguing that it is "fundamental
error" to look at forum fees in isolation from plaintiffs total cost of pursuing claim in
arbitration and that " [a] costs-based challenge to an arbitration agreement . . . should
fail unless the total cost the plaintiff faces in arbitration significantly exceeds the total
cost the plaintiff would face in litigation").
69 See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs. ,  105 F.3d 1465 , 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1996); cf.
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that fee 
splitting provision in employment arbitration agreement "alone would render an
arbitration agreement unenforceable") .  
70 See Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1053-54 (8th Cir. 2004); Blair v. 
Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 607- 1 0  (3d Cir. 2002); Bradford v. Rockwell
Semiconductor Sys. ,  Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556-57 (4th Cir. 2001); Zumpano v. 
Omnipoint Commc'n, No. Civ. A. 00-CV-595, 2001 WL 43781 ,  at *9- 1 1 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
18, 2001) ; cf. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. , 3 1 7  F.3d 646, 663 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding "that potential litigants must be given an opportunity, prior to arbitration on
the merits, to demonstrate that the potential costs of arbitration are great enough to
deter them and Similarly situated individuals from seeking to vindicate their federal
statutory rights in the arbitral forum");  Shankle v. B-G Maint. of Colo . ,  Inc. ,  163 F.3d
1230, 1234-35 (lOth Cir. 1999) (concluding that predispute employment arbitration
agreement was unenforceable where plaintiff "could not afford" to pay one-half of
arbitrator's fee, as required under arbitration agreement, "and it is unlikely other
Similarly situated employees could either") .  
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A second widely voiced criticism is that the limited discovery typical
in arbitration tends to favor the employer in a dispute with its
employee.71 The employee typically finds it extremely helpful and
perhaps essential to utilize some formal discovery such as depositions,
interrogatories, and document requests to gain access to the
information possessed by the employer and the decision makers
pertinent to his claim.72 Conversely, the employer typically has access
to most of the records, documents, and witnesses relevant to an
employment claim without resorting to formal discovery.73 Thus, the
extremely circumscribed discovery available in arbitration, as
contrasted with the more generous discovery available in civil
litigation in court, tends to tilt the playing field in favor of the
employer in arbitration.74 
Professor Christopher Drahozal has reviewed the empirical studies of employment
arbitration fees and costs and concludes as follows: 
For some categories of disputes, administrative fees and arbitrators' fees
exceed the filing fees in court. But provider organizations have capped those
fees for small consumer claims and many employee claims, so that upfront
costs in arbitration for those claims should be very similar to upfront costs
in court. Whether arbitration is more or less costly than litigation overall
depends on how attorneys' fees and other costs compare. Survey evidence
and business experience provides some evidence that the total costs of
arbitration are lower than in litigation, but the evidence is too limited to
draw definitive conclusions.
Drahozal, supra note 68, at 840.
71 See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 67, at 55 (noting concern that arbitration will
systematically disadvantage employees and asserting that ,, [ ul nlike employers,
plaintiffs need modern procedural devices, such as discovery, to uncover evidence that
disputed employment decisions are discriminatory"); Maltby, supra note 63, at 33, 40-
4 1  (explaining how limited discovery typical of arbitration favors employer in dispute
with its employee).
72 See Richard A. Bales, Beyond the Protocol: Recent Trends in Employment
Arbitration, 1 1  EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 301 ,  334 (2007) (noting that "plaintiffs in
employment cases often need to depose fact witnesses, both to find out what
happened, usually by deposing the supervisor andlor decision maker, and to gather
information on comparators") ;  Green, supra note 17,  at 220 (arguing that " [sl ince
ordinarily the employer controls most of the relevant information for a dispute, it is
critical that an employee's right to discovery, which would be guaranteed in court, is
observed in mandated arbitration").
73 Green, supra note 17, at 220; Maltby, supra note 63, at 33 (noting that, unlike
the employee, " [t lhe employer . . .  already has the relevant employment records and
access to the key witnesses, who are generally other employees"); Yarkon, supra note
60, at 186 (noting that employer in employment litigation "has greater . . .  control
over potential witnesses and documentary evidence" than does employee).
H Maltby, supra note 63, at 33, 40-41 .  
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 61 1
A third structural criticism of employment arbitration centers on the
so-called "repeat player" phenomenon.75 The fear generally is that
certain employers will gain an unfair advantage over their employees
in employment arbitration due to the fact that certain employers are
likely to participate in arbitration on numerous occasions, while an
individual employee is likely to arbitrate only once in a lifetime.76 The
repeat-player employer arguably gains some advantage over its
employees due to its greater familiarity with the arbitration process
and with potential arbitrators.77 As Professor Lisa Bingham has
explained, repeat-player employers "may maintain institutional
memory and are better able to use [ their own] records regarding an
arbitrator to make educated selections for the next arbitration case. ,,78
The more serious concern, however, is that an arbitrator will tend to
favor the repeat player employer in the hope that the employer might
then return the favor to the arbitrator by selecting that individual to
arbitrate a future dispute involVing the employer.79 Professor
Bingham's empirical studies demonstrate that repeat-player employers
do better in employment arbitration compared to one-shot
employers.8o Her studies, however, do not purport to demonstrate that
arbitrator bias is a reason for this advantage.8l 
75 See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead, 9 L. & Soc'y
REV. 95 ( 1974) (explicating typology of parties that divides litigants into "repeat
players" and "one-shotters" and discussing each type of party's incentives and
advantages in legal system) ; Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 12 ,  at 191-
202 (discussing repeat player phenomenon in the context of  employment arbitration) ;
Bingham, Adhesive Contracts, supra note 12,  at 239-44 (discussing "several possible
theoretical accounts for why a repeat player effect might arise in" employment
arbitration); Cole, supra note 14, at 452-54 (discussing why "repeat players will have a
distinct and systematic advantage in interactions with one-shot players").
76 Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 12, at 190.
7 7  Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs. ,  105 F.3d 1465 , 1 476 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(commenting that repeat player "employer gains some advantage in having superior
knowledge with respect to selection of an arbitrator"); Cole, supra note 14, at 452-53,
474-77.
78 Bingham, Adhesive Contracts, supra note 12, at 240.
79 See id. at 242 (discussing possibility "that arbitrators, freed from the free market
constraint of having to worry about future selection by both parties, might tend to rule
in favor of the only party in a position to maintain an institutional memory and use
arbitrators again in the future, namely the employer"); Cole, supra note 14, at 478
("Economic coercion clearly plays some role in a system where an arbitrator who
regularly finds in favor of complaining employees may expect that the employer will
be reluctant to rehire him in the future.");  EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 14, at v­
B (arguing that arbitration "results cannot but be influenced by the fact that the
employer, and not the employee, is a potential source of future business for the
arbitrator").
80 See Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 12 ,  at 208- 13 (reporting
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612 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
b. Concerns Relating to Informational and Bargaining Power
Advantages
Turning to the second broad concern surrounding employment
arbitration, critics fear that employers use their informational and
bargaining power advantages to obtain the employee's acquiescence to
an arbitration agreement that grossly favors the employer.s2 Such an
agreement might provide for an arbitrator or pool of arbitrators
tending to favor the employer, limit the employee's remedies,
effectively reduce the applicable statute of limitations, or alter the
burden of proof in a way that advantages the employer.s3 In this way,
the employer might effectively insulate itself from liability for
infringing upon the employee's statutory rights. Professor George
Rutherglen sums up this concern:
results of her study in which in employment arbitrations, employees win less
frequently and win less of what they demanded when arbitrating against repeat-player
employer as compared to when arbitrating against one-shot employer) ; Bingham,
Adhesive Contracts, supra note 12,  at 238-39 (reporting results of her later empirical
study as, "Among employee claims against employers, repeat player employers do
better in employment arbitration than non-repeat player employers");  Lisa B. Bingham
&: Simon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process Protocol for 
Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of Employment: Preliminary
Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NYU 530
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303, 323 tb1.2 (Samuel Estreicher &: David Sherwyn
eds. ,  2004) (reporting results of third study in which employees prevailed in
arbitration 62% of time against one-shot employer but only 29% of time against repeat
player employer).
81 See Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 12,  at 214 ("The above study
does not establish a cause for the repeat player effect. It merely identifies its
presence."); Bingham, Adhesive Contracts, supra note 12 ,  at 238 (hypothesizing that
repeat player effect might in part be product of "the underlying agreement to arbitrate
as reflected in a personnel manual, rather than an individually negotiated contract").
82 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, S. 931 ,  l l l th Congo § 2(3), (7)
(2009) (asserting that " [mlost consumers and employees have little or no meaningful
option whether to submit their claims to arbitration" and that " [ml any corporations
add to their arbitration clauses unfair provisions that deliberately tilt the systems
against individuals"); Stone, Yellow Dog Contract, supra note 14, at 1036 ("At the
moment of hire, employees lack bargaining power and are needful of employment, so
they frequently agree to [ employer-dictated predispute arbitration agreementsl
without giving them much thought.") .  
83 See Sherwyn et aI., Assessing the Case, supra note 54, at 1563 (noting that
" [  cl ritics insist that mandatory arbitration should be prohibited because it . . .  is unfair
to employees because it can be expensive, limit damages, reduce the statute of
limitations, alter the burden of proof, allow for untrained arbitrators to decide cases,
limit discovery, and is biased in favor of employers; and . . . is the product of contracts
of adhesion and unequal bargaining power").
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 613 
In substantive terms, the question is  whether allowing
employees to bargain away their right to judicial remedies in
favor of arbitration confers too great an advantage upon
employers. If employers cannot offer contracts of employment
that violate the law against employment discrimination, how
can they offer contracts that set the terms for enforcing these
laws? Employees cannot waive their protections under these
laws because, it is believed, employers would otherwise use
their superior bargaining power to obtain agreements that
allowed continued discrimination. For the same reason,
arbitration agreements cannot be used as a means of
weakening enforcement of these laws, for instance, by giving
employers effective control over the selection of arbitrators.84 
The concern is not only that the employer has the bargaining power
to force an employee to agree to an arbitration procedure that
disadvantages the employee, but also that the typical employee lacks
the knowledge to make an informed decision with respect to such an
agreement.8S The typical employee likely lacks understanding of what
arbitration is, let alone what arbitration procedure entails.86 Some
argue that this market failure in information alone justifies increased
regulation of employment arbitration contracts.87 
c. Concerns Relating to the Public Goals of Employment
Discrimination Law
Finally, critics of employment arbitration also argue that it does not
serve the public goals of employment discrimination law as well as 
adjudication in court does.88 Employment discrimination laws seek to 
remedy instances of discrimination that individual employees have
suffered.89 In this way, employment discrimination statutes serve
private interests. These laws also seek to eradicate invidious
84 RUTHERGLEN,  supra note 67, at 55. 
85 Haagen, supra note 13, at 1059-60.
86 ld. at 1059.
87 See id. ("Because it is likely to be poorly understood, there is a good public
policy reason to supervise contracts to substitute private dispute resolution
mechanisms for public ones.").
88 See generally Moohr, supra note 61, at 396 (arguing that "arbitration is not an
effective forum in which to satisfy the public goals of employment discrimination
statutes, even when employees are accorded a fair hearing") .  
8 9  ld. at  420 ("Federal employment discrimination law is a network of statutes,
each enacted as part of a broad congressional effort to protect employees from
discrimination in the workplace.").
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6 14 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
discrimination from the workplace.90 Therefore, employment
discrimination statutes serve the public interest.91 
Litigation of employment discrimination claims in court serves the
public goal of eliminating invidious workplace discrimination in
several ways.92 First, public adjudication of employment
discrimination claims serves a general deterrence function.93 When an
employer is held accountable in court for its discrimination, other
employers see and appreciate that the first employer has been made to
pay a price for its discrimination.94 This example deters other
employers from engaging in discrimination.95 Second, litigation of
employment discrimination claims in court develops and refines the
laws proscribing employment discrimination.96 This elaborated body
of law then governs future disputes97 and guides employers with
respect to the appropriateness of their future conduct. Finally,
litigation in court of employment discrimination claims educates the
public about the legality of certain employment practices and develops
and reinforces cultural norms that abhor invidious discrimination.98 
90 Id. at 400, 42l .  
9 1  Green, supra note 17 ,  a t  1 7 7  (noting that "when a decision i s  rendered o n  a civil
rights claim, its effect is felt by society as a whole"); Moohr, supra note 6 1 ,  at 421-23
(noting that Title VII has as its public policy goal "solv[ing] the general problem of
discrimination" and explicating how eradication of employment discrimination serves
public interest by confirming defining American value of equality, reducing racial
tension, and remOving barriers to economic growth); .  
9 2  Moohr, supra note 6 1 ,  a t  400, 426-27 ( " U l udicial adjudication [ o f  employment
discrimination claims] generates specific and general deterrence, educates the public ,  
creates precedent, develops uniform law, and forms public values.") 
93 Id. at 427-31 (setting out how employment discrimination litigation and its
attendant compensatory and punitive damage awards specifically and generally deter
employers from future violations of employment discrimination statutes).
94 EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 14, at IV-C ("By awarding damages, backpay,
and injunctive relief as a matter of public record, the courts not only compensate
victims of discrimination, but provide notice to the community, in a very tangible
way, of the costs of discrimination.").
95 Moohr, supra note 61, at 400, 430-3 1 (setting out various ways in which " [ t] he
example of a sanctioned employer discourages others from engaging in similar
practices" and how " [g] eneral deterrence more effectively induces compliance with
the law than specific deterrence") .  
96 EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 14,  at IV-A (noting that " [a]bsent the role of
the courts, there might be no discrimination claims today based on, for example, the
adverse impact of neutral practices not justified by business necessity, . . .  or sexual
harassment") ;  Moohr, supra note 6 1 ,  at 400, 432-35.
97 Moohr, supra note 6 1 ,  at 432.
98 Id. at 400, 437-38 ("In articulating the standard of acceptable conduct, an 
adjudication reaffirms these values and forms community standards.") .
   
  
 
  
  
   
 
   
   
   
  
 
  
   
 
 
 
  
  
 
   
   
  
 
  
 
  
   
  
 
   
 
 
  
  
   
     
  
 
 
  
    
 
   
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
    
  
 
 
   
 
   
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
   
  
  
 
   
   
 
  
  
 
 
   
  
 
   
 
  
 
   
 
   
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
    
    
 
   
 
   
 
  
 
   
  
  
  
  
  
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
    
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
    
 
  
 
 
 
   
  
  
 
   
 
  
  
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
   
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
   
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
      
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
    
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
        
       
   
       
  
     
 
 
       
           
        
             
      
           
      
    
           
       
          
    
 
      
    
              
            
 
            
            
          
           
             
             
               
            
              
             
            
          
           
             
        
              
  
             
            
            
             
             
             
            
              
            
            
2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 615 
Compared to public adjudication, arbitration of an employment
discrimination claim, as it is typically structured, is less effective at
general deterrence, development and refinement of the law, and
development and reinforcement of cultural norms.99 Because
arbitration is private and the arbitrator does not produce a public
reasoned decision, employers are less likely to learn of an arbitration
award that punishes another employer's discrimination and are less
likely to view any such award as a clear rebuke of specific employer
behavior . lOo An arbitration award against an employer, therefore, is 
less likely to serve the function of general deterrence. 101 Moreover,
arbitration of employment discrimination claims does not contribute
significantly to a more developed law of employment discrimination.
This is in part because of the private nature of arbitration and the lack
of published, reasoned decisions supporting arbitration awards, and in
part because arbitration awards do not serve as binding precedent
beyond the case at hand. 102 Finally, these same features of arbitration,
99 Id. at 439.
100 See id. at 43 1 (noting that "the private and confidential nature of arbitration
creates an environment in which only the parties know about the claim and its
disposition").  
101 EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 14, at V-A-l (arguing that arbitration's
private nature weakens general deterrence); Moohr, supra note 6 1 ,  at 432 (concluding
that "arbitration foregoes general deterrence as a means of effecting Title VII and
utilizes only specific deterrence of the party to the suit") ;  see also Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, S. 93 1 ,  l I l th Congo § 2(6) (2009) (asserting that
" [ ml andatory arbitration is a poor system for protecting civil rights . . .  because it is
not transparent") .  This is not to say that arbitration awards do not well serve a specific
deterrence function. See Fitzgibbon, supra note 59, at 1413 (postulating that " [a ln
arbitration decision closer in time to the events or conduct in question will send a
message to the workplace and exert a conduct regulating effect" and giving as example
lessons learned by coworkers when fellow employee who had been discharged in
violation of employment discrimination statute is promptly reinstated) ; Michael H. 
LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Reinventing the Enterprise Wheel: Court Review of Punitive
Awards in Labor and Employment Arbitrations, 1 1  HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 199, 203
(2006) (asserting that " [mlulti-million dollar employment [arbitrationl awards show
that private judges are performing a public funtion by deterring reprehensible . . . 
misconduct") . 
102 See H.R. 1020, S. 931 ,  § 2(5) (2009) (asserting that " [mlandatory arbitration
undermines the development of public law for civil rights and consumer rights
because there is no meaningful judiCial review of arbitrators' decisions"); EEOC Policy
Statement, supra note 1 4, at V-A-2 (stating that "arbitration affords no opportunity to
build a jurisprudence through precedent"); Moohr, supra note 6 1 ,  at 403, 437 (noting
that "arbitrators decide claims within a system in which each arbitrator is independent
and in which no correcting hierarchy exists" and " [c] onsequently, arbitration does not
produce a uniform or consistent law");  Stone, Yellow Dog Contract, supra note 14, at
1043 ("A . . .  problem with mandatory arbitration of statutory rights is that statutory
disputes are being decided in private tribunals which generate no publicly available
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616 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:59 1
especially its private nature, make arbitration of employment
discrimination claims less effective at developing and reinforcing
cultural norms. 103
In light of these perceived structural shortcomings of employment
arbitration, commentators have called for reforms of employment
arbitration aimed at safeguarding the ability of an employee to
vindicate his statutory rights and at promoting the public interest in
eliminating invidious workplace discrimination. 104 These proposed
reforms seek enhanced discovery, a record of the arbitration hearing
for purposes of an appeal, the writing of a reasoned opinion
accompanying the arbitrator's decision, and enhanced judicial review
of the arbitrator's decision for errors of law. 105 In short, these proposed
reforms seek to alter employment arbitration to structure it more like
public adjudication in the civil court system.106 In this way, reform of
employment arbitration threatens to make it redundant and not an
"alternative" dispute resolution mechanism at all. 107
norms to guide actors or decisionmakers in the future.") .  
103 Moohr, supra note 61, at  439 (concluding that "because arbitration is
confidential, private, and final, it foregoes effective mechanisms - [including] . . .  the
formation and affirmation of public values - for enforcing the public policy" of
employment discrimination laws); Stone, Yellow Dog Contract, supra note 14, at 1043
(predicting that increased use of arbitration agreements as condition of employment
will "mean [ ]  that the law cannot play an educational role of shaping parties' norms
and sense of right and wrong, and therefore it cannot shape behavior in its shadow") .  
104 See generally Gorman, supra note 61 ;  Moohr, supra note 6 1 ;  Speidel, supra note
1 , at 1087-9l .
105 See Gorman, supra note 6 1 ,  at 639, 679-80 (calling for "due process of
arbitration" that would include enhanced discovery, recording of arbitration hearing
for use on appeal, written reasoned decision by arbitrator, and enhanced judicial
review of arbitrator's application of law); Moohr, supra note 6 1 ,  at 447-50 (discussing
enhanced judicial review of employment arbitration awards, which necessarily would
require record of arbitration proceedings and written, reasoned arbitrator opinion, as
means of promoting goal of ending employment discrimination by "incorporat[ing]
some measure of the enforcement mechanisms of litigation into arbitration"); Stone,
Rustic Justice, supra note 58, at 1025-30 (calling for minimal due process protections
and de novo judicial review of questions of law in arbitrations between "insiders,"
such as employers, who design and maintain arbitral system and "outsiders," such as 
employees, who play no role in shaping arbitral system) .
106 See Haagen, supra note l3, at lO44 (commenting that proposed arbitration
reforms "aim, in short, to make arbitration more 'lawlike' ").  
1 0 7  CJ. Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1 135, 1 10th Congo (2007) (proposing to
entitle parties to arbitration contract to certain minimum "fair procedures for
arbitration" such as face-to-face hearing and written explanation of basis for 
arbitrator's decision) ;  Moohr, supra note 6 1 ,  at 454 (conceding that reforms she is
conSidering would make arbitration more expensive and, in that regard, "less
attractive to all involved"); id. (noting that " [ i ] f  added costs make arbitration
inaccessible to many employees, the reason for providing it disappears") . See generally
    
  
         
 
  
  
 
  
   
   
 
  
 
    
 
  
     
 
 
  
  
  
    
 
   
  
 
 
 
    
   
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
   
     
  
   
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
    
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
   
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
    
    
  
   
 
 
   
  
 
   
   
 
 
  
  
  
 
   
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
   
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
        
       
          
      
    
         
   
      
       
       
        
        
       
      
        
       
  
       
       
   
       
    
 
 
        
          
       
            
  
 
   
       
         
        
         
         
        
               
            
 
     
        
              
              
             
   
              
      
2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 6 1 7  
Instead o f  reform, other critics have called for legislation prohibiting
enforcement of predispute employment arbitration agreements. lOS The
rationales discussed above for and against regulating the employment
relationship and employment arbitration allow for an evaluation of
three questions regarding the ideal scope of legislation that would
invalidate predispute employment arbitration agreements: first, 
whether Congress should invalidate predispute arbitration agreements
relating to certain types of employment claims (namely, statutory
discrimination claims) but not other types of employment claims
(namely, state common law employment claims) ; second, whether
Congress should exempt from any such legislation certain employees
based on the employees' position with the employer; and third,
whether Congress should exempt from any such legislation certain
employers based on the employers' size. The remainder of this Article
assesses these three questions.
II. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT LAw CLAIMS
FOR THE PURPOSES OF LEGISLATION INVALIDATING PREDISPUTE
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Recently Congress has considered two approaches to legislation
invalidating predispute employment arbitration agreements. 109 The
first approach would invalidate any predispute arbitration agreement
relating to an employment disputeyo The second approach would
invalidate predispute employment arbitration agreements only as they
relate to claims arising under federal law, I I I  or under certain specified
federal employment statutes . l l2 Under this second approach,
employers would still be free to force employees to enter into
arbitration agreements regarding common law claims, such as breach
of contract, wrongful discharge, defamation, or intentional infliction
Thomas Stipanowich, Arbitration: The "New Litigation" 7-S (Pepperdine Univ. Legal
Studies Research, Paper No. 15 ,  2009) , available at hup:llpapers.ssrn.com/
so13/papers.cfm?abstracCid= 1297526 (asserting that arbitration "has taken on more
and more of the features of court trial" and that " [tl he higher costs associated with
these developments is a leading cause for complaint about arbitration among business
users") .
108 See supra note 17 .  
109 See supra notes lS-25 and accompanying text.
1 10 See H.R. 1020, S. 93 1 ,  l 1 1 th Congo (2009) (proposing this approach); see also 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, S. 1 7S2, 1 10th Congo (2007) (same) .III See Civil Rights Act of 200S, H.R. 5 1 29, S. 2554, 1 l0th Congo (200S)
(proposing this approach) .
1 1 2  See, e.g., Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 2001 ,  H.R. 14S9, S. 163,
107th Congo (2001)  (proposing this approach) .
   
          
        
  
     
      
   
  
   
   
  
          
 
 
         
  
      
    
      
    
 
   
      
    
     
 
   
 
    
 
     
     
    
   
   
     
 
   
   
  
       
 
  
     
  
       
 
   
      
          
        
  
 
    
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
          
  
 
         
    
 
              
 
       
  
       
      
 
      
    
 
      
  
    
     
  
  
      
  
     
      
   
      
     
  
      
   
       
   
 
   
 
        
 
   
 
         
         
        
          
        
   
      
  
       
        
          
      
       
         
        
        
        
        
       
       
       
      
       
           
       
                
 
             
        
        
          
     
     
        
           
    
            
         
               
            
       
     
    
618 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
of emotional distress, as a condition of employment or retention. For
the reasons discussed below, any statute prohibiting enforcement of
predispute employment arbitration agreements should adopt the first
approach, embodied in the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, and
invalidate predispute arbitration agreements with respect to any type
of employment claim.
A. The Role of the Public Interest in the Enforcement of Employment
Arbitration Agreements
Bills such as the Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act of 2008
and the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 2001 focus on
federal statutory claims to the exclusion of contract and common law
claims . 1 13 This focus likely arises from, and at a minimum comports
with, the principal concern of preventing harms to society, rather than
of protecting individual employees. 1 14 This assertion partly stems from
the fact that criticisms of arbitration that are principally, or at least
largely, concerned with protecting the individual - concerns with
inequality of bargaining power, with market failures such as
informational disadvantages, with features of arbitration such as
limited discovery and high arbitration fees, and with the purported
repeat player phenomenon - have equal force with respect to
common law claims as with respect to statutory claims. Therefore, a
preoccupation with statutory claims likely reflects the view that these
types of claims, unlike common law claims, are of such great
importance to society as a whole that special regulation of the
arbitration of such claims is warranted. 1 15
I l3 H.R. 5 1 29, S. 2554, 1 l0th Congo § 423 (2008); S. 163, H.R. 1489, 107th Congo
(2001) .  
1 1 4  See Ware, Voluntary Consent, supra note 13,  at 1 01 -02 (asserting that argument
that courts should enforce employment arbitration agreements if claim asserted arises
from contract but not if claim asserted arises from employment discrimination law "is
based on the notion that certain claims have such importance to people who are not
parties to the dispute that the freedom of the parties to choose how to resolve their
dispute should be restricted to advance the interests of these nonparties").
l lS See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 14, at II ( "Federal civil rights laws,
including the laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, play a unique role in
American jurisprudence. They flow directly from core Constitutional principles, and
this nation's history testifies to their necessity and profound importance. Any analysis
of the mandatory arbitration of rights guaranteed by the employment discrimination
laws must, at the outset, be squarely based in an understanding of the history and
purpose of these laws.") .  For such an argument against allowing arbitration of
employment discrimination claims, see Moohr, supra note 6 1 ,  at 420-39 (arguing that
strong public policy in favor of eradicating workplace discrimination militates against
enforCing predispute employment arbitration agreements).
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 619 
Even if  Congress were solely concerned in regulating employment
arbitration with preventing harms to society, legislation prohibiting
enforcement of predispute employment arbitration agreements should
extend beyond the arbitration of federal statutory claims and include
also the arbitration of state tort claims for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy.1I6 The basis for the public policy wrongful
discharge tort is that, in the words of the Restatement (Third) of 
Employment Law, "certain discharges harm not only the specific
employee but also third parties and society as a whole in ways
contrary to established norms of public policy. . . .  Recognition of this
tort forces employers to internalize the costs of the harm they cause,
and thereby encourages behavior consistent with those norms. "  l l7 
Public policy, therefore, dictates that an employer should not be
allowed to discharge an employee for behavior that furthers an
overriding public interest where the discharge would tend to deter
furthering that interest. l i S  Prototypical examples include a discharge
based on the employee's refusal to engage in conduct that violates the
law or insistence on engaging in conduct that is mandated by law. 119
1. California Law
California law governing the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
wrongful discharge claims emphaSizes the importance of society's
interests. A seminal wrongful discharge case is Petermann v. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters , 120 in which the employee
alleged that he was terminated because he failed to commit perjury
before a committee of the California Assembly. 121 The Petermann court
1 I6 See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 732-33 ( 1999) (arguing that proper class of
inarbitrable claims should be those relating to mandatory legal rules, whether
statutory or common law, and class of arbitrable claims should be those relating to
default legal rules, whether statutory or common law).
I l7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAw § 4.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2009).
liB See Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)
(concluding that "in order to more fully effectuate the state's declared policy against
perjury, the civil law . . .  must deny the employer his generally unlimited right to
discharge an employee whose employment is for an unspecified duration, when the
reason for the dismissal is the employee's refusal to commit perjury") .  
1 19 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAw § 4.02(a) , (b) (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2009).
120 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. App. 1959) .
121 Id. at 26.
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620 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43 :591
held that the employee had sufficiently stated a cause of action. 122 The
court reasoned:
The presence of false testimony in any proceeding tends to
interfere with the proper administration of public affairs and
the administration of justice. It would be obnoxious to the
interests of the state and contrary to public policy and sound
morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee . . .  
on the ground that the employee declined to commit
perjury. 123 
Given that society's interests are strongly offended by a wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy, society arguably has a
particularly strong interest in regulating the terms of any arbitration of
public policy wrongful discharge claims. 124
California law on employment arbitration reflects this broad view on
when the law should subject employment arbitration to heightened
regulation and scrutiny. In California, the test for whether heightened
standards are reqUired for an employment arbitration centers on
whether the public interest is implicated. Thus, employment
arbitrations adjudicating an unwaivable statutory or common law
claim, such as the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, must
satisfy certain heightened requirements to ensure that the employee
may effectively vindicate her unwaivable rights in the arbitration. 125 
In Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. , 126 the
California Supreme Court held that when an employer imposes an
arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, the arbitration of
an employee's claims under the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act ("FEHA") must meet certain minimum standards to
guarantee that the employee can effectively vindicate his statutory
rights in the arbitral forum. 127 The Armendariz decision set forth four
specific requirements. First, the arbitrator must have the authority to
award any remedies available under the statute. us Second, the
122 Id. at 28.
1 23 Id. at 27. 
1 24 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAw § 4.01 cmt. e (Tentative Draft
No. 1 ,  2009) ("The tort of employer retaliation in violation of public policy is
available notwithstanding any agreement between an employer and its employees that
purports to preclude such claims. This is so because the purpose of the tort is to
protect third-party and public interests, not just the particular employee's.").  
1 25 Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc.,  63 P.3d 979, 987 (Cal. 2003).
1 26 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
127 Id. at 674.128 Id. at 682-83. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
   
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
   
  
  
   
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
 
 
   
 
  
   
    
  
 
 
   
 
   
  
 
  
  
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
   
  
   
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
        
       
   
   
    
       
       
        
        
       
          
        
          
            
          
          
         
         
       
     
 
   
          
         
       
 
     
        
       
    
               
             
          
  
    
            
          
            
           
           
              
           
            
               
               
               
             
             
       
              
                 
20091 Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 621 
arbitration process must provide for discovery that is sufficient for the
employee to vindicate his statutory claim. 129 Third, the arbitrator must
issue a written decision such that the award might be subject to
judicial review "sufficient to ensure the arbitrators comply with the
requirements of the statute." 130 And fourth, the employer must "pay all
types of costs that are unique to arbitration. " 13 1
The Armendariz court grounded its holding on the notion that
certain statutory rights are unwaivable. 132 For this proposition, the
court cited first to California Civil Code section 1668, which provided
that contracts to exempt a party from responsibility for "his own
fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or
violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of
the law." m  The court cited also to California Civil Code section 3513,
which provided that " [a lnyone may waive the advantage of a law
intended solely for his benefit . . .  [blut a law established for a public
reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement. " 134 The court
found that the FEHA was enacted to serve a public interest and,
therefore, its protections were not waivable. 135 Given that a party
could not waive the FEHA's protections, the court held that any
arbitration to adjudicate claims brought under the FEHA must not
effect a de facto waiver of such rights. 136 That is, any such arbitration
must meet the enunciated minimum standards to ensure that the
employee can effectively vindicate his rights in arbitration.
129 Id. at 683-85.
130 Id. at 685 (holding that "in order for such judicial review to be successfully
accomplished, an arbitrator in an FEHA case must issue a written arbitration decision
that will reveal, however briefly, the essential findings and conclusions on which the
award is based").
13 1 Id. at 689.
132 Id. at 680. More precisely, certain statutory rights are unwaivable pre-dispute.
See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An
Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 226 (2000) (noting that "the post­
dispute arbitration agreement is analogous to a settlement decision");  Stephen ] .  Ware,
Interstate Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAw IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, supra
note 53, at 88, 1 1 4-15 (Edward Brunet et al. eds. ,  2006) (noting that " [pl ost-dispute
settlement agreements are, of course, routinely enforced without any judicial review
over how the parties chose to resolve claims arising out of mandatory rules").
1 3 3  Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 680; see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 1668 (West 1985).
134 ArmendariZ, 6 P.3d at 680; see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 35 13 (West 1997) .
135 ArmendariZ, 6 P.3d at 680-81; see also id. at 681 (noting that policy against
sexual harassment and sex discrimination in employment "inures to the benefit of the
public at large rather than to a particular employer or employee" (quoting Rojo v.  
Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 375-77 (Cal. 1990» ) .
136 Id. at 68 1 (commenting that "it is evident that an arbitration agreement cannot
be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of statutory rights created by the FEHA").  
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
    
  
 
     
    
 
       
        
    
         
           
      
         
         
          
        
           
       
       
       
      
         
      
        
    
 
  
        
 
        
   
        
   
           
        
         
            
  
      
      
  
               
          
    
              
 
    
  
622 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591 
The California Supreme Court later extended the Armendariz
minimum requirements for arbitration of claims under the FEHA to
certain claims of wrongful discharge. 137 In Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. ,138
the court reasoned that a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy is "almost by definition unwaivable" given that, inter
alia, the public policy grounding the wrongful discharge claim "must
be public in that it affects society at large rather than the
individual . "  139 Thus, " [A]  legitimate [wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy] claim is designed to protect a public interest and
therefore cannot be contravened by a private agreement. " l40 Finally,
the court reasoned that because the employee may not waive his claim
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, the employer
"cannot impose on the arbitration of these claims such burdens or
procedural shortcomings as to preclude their vindication." 141 The
court held, therefore, that the arbitration of a claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy must satisfy the minimum
standards set forth in Armendariz. 142 
In sum, under California law, the standards for enforcement of a
predispute employment arbitration agreement differ depending on
whether the employee's asserted claim principally implicates the
public interest or only private rights. 143 If the former, the arbitration
proceeding must meet the heightened standards set forth in
Armendariz.l44 If the latter, the agreement is merely tested against
conscionability standards. 145
2. The Opposing View of the u.s. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has rejected the argument that the heightened
requirements applied under the law of that circuit to employment
137 Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. ,  63 P.3d 979, 987 (Cal. 2003).
138 Id. 
139 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) .
140 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) .
141 Id. 
142 ld.; see also id. at 989 (commenting that "there is no reason under Annendariz's
logic to distinguish between unwaivable statutory rights and unwaivable rights
derived from common law").
143 Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 431·32 (Cl. App.
2004).
144 Id. at 432.
145 Id. 
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 623
arbitrations of federal statutory rights should be extended to 
arbitrations of common law claims rooted in public policy. 146 In Cole 
v. Burns International Security Services , 147 the D.C.  Circuit held that an
employer may not require an employee to agree to arbitrate his
statutory claims as a condition of employment if the arbitration
agreement requires the employee to pay any of the arbitrator's fees or
expenses. 148 The court reasoned that " [u] nder Gilmer, arbitration is
supposed to be a reasonable substitute for a judicial forum." 
Therefore, "it would undermine Congress's intent to prevent
employees who are seeking to vindicate statutory rights from gaining
access to a judicial forum and then require them to pay for the services
of an arbitrator when they would never be required to pay for a judge
in court." 149 
Four years after deciding Cole, the D.C. Circuit held in Brown v. 
Wheat First Securities, Inc. lso that the reasoning of Cole should not be
extended to cover arbitration of an employee's public policy-rooted
common law claims. In Brown, the employee alleged, inter alia, that
his employer had fired him for alerting the Securities and Exchange
Commission to his employer's alleged illegal activities and, thus, that
the employer had wrongfully discharged him in violation of public
policy. 151 The employee argued that because he was arbitrating
pursuant to an arbitration agreement that was offered as a condition of
employment, and because he was pursuing "public law" claims, Cole 
prohibited the arbitrators from assessing arbitration fees against
him. ls2 In declining to extend Cole to common law claims grounded in
public policy, the D.C. Circuit remarked that "our central rationale [in
Cole] - respecting congreSSional intent - does not extend beyond
the statutory context. " 153 The question of past congressional intent,
however, is not an impediment to future congressional legislation that
would regulate or invalidate predispute employment arbitration
agreements relating to certain types of claims. This reasoning in
Brown, therefore, is irrelevant in considering the optimal scope of a
statute prohibiting enforcement of predispute employment arbitration
agreements.
146 Brown v. Wheat First Sec., Inc., 257 F.3d 821 , 825 (D.C. Cir. 2001) .  
147 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
148 Id. at 1 485.
149 Id. at 1484. 
150 257 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 200 1) .  
151 Id. at 823. 
152 Id. at 823-24. 
153 Id. at 825. 
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3. Drawing a Line Between the Public and Private Interest
The Brown court went on to argue that if it were to extend Cole to
wrongful discharge claims merely because such claims are grounded
in public policy, it would be difficult to find any common law claims
falling outside of Cole's protections. The court reasoned:
All claims not based on contract - including . . .  defamation
and tortious interference claims . . .  implement values that
society has in one way or another thought deserving. Even
contract . . .  rests ultimately on social decisions to support
fulfillment of promises either as a good in itself or as an
instrumental good, facilitating people's investment in projects
that depend on other's adherence to their promises. 1 54 
A meaningful line can be drawn, however, between public policy
claims and other common law claims such as defamation and tortious
interference. The critical issue is not whether the cause of action
merely touches upon the public's interest, but whether the cause of
action Significantly and directly "inures to the benefit of the public at
large," as in the case of the public policy wrongful discharge claim. 155 
This contrasts with causes of action that exist principally to vindicate
the particular employee's or employer's private interests, as in the case
of a claim of defamation or tortious interference with contract. 156 One
California court of appeal framed the test as follows: "An unwaivable
154 Id. at 826; see also Gorman, supra note 6 1 ,  at 642 (arguing that "the distinction
between public and private claims is fragile" and positing that contract enforcement
rules "serve a larger social objective beyond mere private redress or compensation");
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. 
MARY'S L.J . 259, 35 1-52 ( 1990) (arguing that "virtually every statute and all actions
recognized by the common law seek not only to do justice between the parties but
also to govern and mold conduct" and, in that sense, even average commercial
contract dispute contains element of " 'socia\' or 'public' interest").
155 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp . ,  765 P.2d 373, 379 (Cal. 1988) (refusing to
recognize claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy deriving from
"statute [thatl simply regulate !sl  conduct between private individuals, or impose !sl
requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy
concerns").
156 See Fittante v. Palm Springs Motors, Inc. ,  1 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 659, 686 (Ct. App.
2003) (extending Annendariz to arbitration of claims arising under California Labor
Code section 970 because " [rlules against fraud and abuse by unscrupulous employers
inure to the benefit of the public generally, not merely to a particular employer or
employee"); cf. Little v. Auto Stiegler, 63 P.3d 979, 999 (Cal. 2003) (Brown, ] . ,
concurring and dissenting) (criticizing majority's focus on whether claim is waivable
or unwaivable in determining applicability of heightened standards for employment
arbitration in light of fact that any intentional tort claim is unwaivable under
California Civil Code section 1668) .
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2009) Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 625
statutory right is one enacted for a public purpose, and may be
recognized by the test question, would it contravene public policy to
allow the parties to exact a waiver of its protection? " 157 Claims
implicating principally a public purpose include those asserted under
Title VII , the ADEA, the ADA, the FLSA, and the claim of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy. Indeed, with respect to the
public policy wrongful discharge claim, the employee generally must
demonstrate that his termination implicates a specific and definite
interest beyond those of himself and the employer. 158 Claims
implicating principally a private purpose include breach of express or
implied contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress , negligent or
intentional misrepresentation, negligent or intentional interference
with contract or prospective economic advantage, and defamation.
B. Harmonizing Regulation ofEmployment Arbitration Agreements with
the Goals ofArbitration
The principal rationale for specially regulating the arbitration of
federal statutory employment claims - protecting the public interest,
as opposed to protecting the private interests of employees - also
extends to the arbitration of public policy wrongful discharge
claims. 159 Thus, an arbitration prohibition that includes federal
157 Fittante, 1 29 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 667.
158 See Foley, 765 P.2d at 380 ("When the duty of an employee to disclose
information to his employer serves only the private interest of the employer, the
rationale underlying the [wrongful discharge in violation of public policy] cause of
action is not implicated.") ;  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAw § 402 reporter's
notes, cmt. f (Discussion Draft, 2008) ("In the absence of a whistleblower statute,
courts tend to limit whistleblowing protection to situations that implicate an
established public policy affecting third parties, as opposed to mere internal
misconduct affecting principally the company's shareholders and managers.") .  
159 One might argue that Congress could sensibly invalidate predispute
employment arbitration agreements with respect to federal statutory claims but
exclude state public policy wrongful discharge claims from the invalidation because
protection of the public interests grounding the state tort should be left to the states.
The FAA, however, as it currently exists, forbids states from specially regulating
arbitration contracts whenever the FAA applies to the contract. See Doctor's Assocs., 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 68 1 ,  687 (1996) ("By enacting § 2 [of the FAA] , we have
several times said, Congress precluded States from Singling out arbitration provisions
for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed 'upon the same
footing as other contracts.' " (citation omitted)). States, therefore, are powerless to
prohibit enforcement of predispute employment arbitration agreements as they relate
to public policy tort claims if the arbitration contract is subject to the FAA. See 
Haagen, supra note 13, at 1046 (concluding that Supreme Court has interpreted FAA
in way that has "effectively stripped from the states the ability to regulate the fairness
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626 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
statutory claims and state common law public policy employment
claims, but does not include other contract or common law
employment claims, is theoretically defensible. Arguably, when one
weighs the virtues of employment arbitration against the need to 
protect the public interest, the scale tips in favor of invalidating
predispute employment arbitration agreements. Conversely, when one
separately weighs these same virtues of employment arbitration
against the need to protect the private interests of employees, arguably
the scale tips in favor of honoring such predispute employment
arbitration agreements. The problem with this approach is that such a
partial invalidation makes little sense in light of the fact that one of the
central goals of employment arbitration is to resolve employment
disputes in a timely and economical manner. 160 
Indeed, a principal goal of arbitration generally is to adjudicate
disputes in a more timely and cost-efficient manner than typically
occurs in civil litigation in court. 161 This is certainly a principal goal of
employment arbitration. 162 As noted earlier, the expeditious arbitration
of an employment dispute not only can reduce the financial and
personal costs of adjudicating the dispute, but can also increase the
chances of preserving the relationship between employer and
employee. 163
A statute that renders unenforceable a contract calling for
arbitration of federal statutory and state common law public policy
of' predispute agreements to arbitrate); Sternlight, supra note 14, at 643, 668
(concluding that after Casarotto, "state legislatures will be permitted to protect
consumers and others from unfair binding arbitration clauses only to the extent they
regulate purely local transactions, or draft legislation that addresses arbitration jointly
with other concerns").
160 Cf Allied Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U .s. 265, 275 (1995)
(interpreting FAA's "involving commerce" language broadly and arguing that "a
narrower interpretation is not consistent with the [FAAl's purpose, for . . .  such an
interpretation would create a new, unfamiliar test . . . thereby unnecessarily
complicating the law and breeding litigation from a statute that seeks to avoid it") .  
1 6 1  Cole, supra note 14, at 450 ("The many proponents of arbitration suggest that
its value lies primarily in permitting faster, cheaper, and more efficient resolution of
disputes."); see also Allied Bruce Tenninix Co., 5 1 3  U.S. at 277 78 (interpreting FAA's
"evidencing a transaction involving commerce" language to mean "commerce in fact" 
and rejecting "contemplation of the parties" test, as latter test would "risk [ ]  the very
kind of costs and delay through litigation (about the circumstances of contract
formation) that Congress wrote the [FAA] to help the parties avoid").
162 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.s. 105, 1 23 (2001 )  (commenting
that " [a]rbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit
that may be of particular importance in employment litigation, which often involves
smaller sums of money than disputes concerning commercial contracts") .
163 See supra notes 59 60 and accompanying text.
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 627
employment claims, but allows enforcement of a contract calling for
arbitration of all other employment law claims, is structurally
inconsistent with arbitration's central goal of providing a more timely
and less expensive claim adjudication. l64 Such a structure would invite
dual adjudications of an employee's claims. The employee'S federal
statutory and state common law public policy claims could be
adjudicated only in court, while all of the employee's other claims
could be adjudicated in a separate arbitration. Having such dual
adjudications negates any time and cost savings that arbitration of
employment law claims might otherwise provide. As a result, the use
of employment arbitration would likely be sharply cunailed. 165 An
employer that might otherwise wish to arbitrate its employees'
arbitrable claims will choose to abandon arbitration to avoid the
expense and delays attendant to dual adjudications of an employee's
claims. Employers, therefore, should be equally indifferent to a statute
invalidating predispute employment arbitration agreements that
covers only federal statutory employment claims and one that covers
any type of employment claim.
For these reasons, if Congress were to enact a statute prohibiting
enforcement of predispute employment arbitration agreements, that
prohibition should be universal as to the types of covered employee
claims. The question of whether Congress should carve out exceptions
from such a statute based on the status of the employee or the size of
the employer still remains. The next two parts of this Article discuss
the merits of exempting high-level employees and small employers
from any legislation invalidating predispute employment arbitration
agreements and the mechanics of how best to do so.
164 See Adams, 523 U.S. at 1 23 (rejecting interpretation of FAA that would have
given rise to "the necessity of bifurcation of proceedings in those cases where state law
precludes arbitration of certain types of employment claims but not others" and
noting that such bifurcation would increase litigation costs to parties).
165 See Estreicher, Satums for Rickshaws, supra note 59, at 562 (arguing that
employers would have responded to certain legal uncertainty that would have arisen
under narrow construction of § 1 of FAA and "inability to obtain under state law a
complete resolution of all of the claims arising in a particular employment dispute, by
abandoning employment arbitration entirely") .  
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628 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:59 1
III. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN HIGH-LEVEL EMPLOYEES AND Low­
LEVEL EMPLOYEES FOR THE PURPOSES OF LEGISLATION INVALIDATING
PREOISPUTE EMPLOYMENT ARBlTRATION AGREEMENTS
A. The Merits of Distinguishing Between High-Level Employees and
Low-Level Employees
A number of the common concerns regarding arbitration ansmg
from predispute employment arbitration agreements do not have equal
force across the spectrum of employees. First, compared to low-level
employees, high-level employees are more likely to possess greater
bargaining leverage, sophistication, and informational advantages in
negotiating the terms of any employment agreement with their
employer or potential employer. 166 For example, a recent study of CEO
employment contracts found that CEOs of S&P 1500 companies
"overwhelmingly contract around the at-will default standard of
termination. ,, 167 Consequently, high-level employees are less likely to
enter into an arbitration agreement with their employer or potential
employer that is grossly unfair to the employee. 168 There is not as
166 See Stewart ] . Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO 
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
23 1 ,  232, 266 (2006) (reviewing contracts of 375 CEOs of S&P 1500 companies and
concluding that these contracts provide "evidence that CEOs have significant
bargaining power in their negotiations over the terms of their employment contracts
and change in control agreements" and concluding that "the differences between
these CEO contracts and those of other corporate workers seem quite stark"); cf 
Fitzgibbon, supra note 59, at 1 424 (proposing that courts take "hands-off' approach
to enforcement of arbitration agreements between employer and its high level
employee "on the theory that a higher ranking employee has some bargaining power
and some choice and likely traded off the right to go to court for other terms" while
also proposing that courts "carefully assess the terms of the arbitration agreement in
the case of a lower-level employee with no real bargaining power and limited choices
even as to other job opportunities") ; Michele M. Buse, Comment, Contracting
Employment Disputes out of theJury System: An Analysis of the Implementation ofBinding
Arbitration in the Non-Union Workplace and Proposals to Reduce the Harsh Effects of a
Non Appealable Award, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1485, 1516 (1995) (hypothesizing that
predispute employment arbitration agreement between employer and high level
employee is less likely to be successfully challenged as contract of adhesion than is
similar agreement entered into by low level employee because of high level employee's
greater relative bargaining power); Robert ]. Lewton, Comment, Are Mandatory, 
Binding Arbitration ReqUirements a Viable Solution for Employers Seeking to Avoid
Litigating Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 991 ,  1 020-2 1
( 1 996) (same).
167 Schwab & Thomas, supra note 1 66, at 233; see also id. at 246.
168 There is some evidence that high-level employees do better in employment
arbitration than do low level employees. See Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 629
much of a concern, therefore, that these high-level employees will
bargain away the means to effectively vindicate their statutory and
public policy claims against their employers. 169 
Moreover, high-level employees are more likely than low-level
employees to be able to afford up front any costs that are unique to
arbitration.17o Critics of predispute employment arbitration agreements
worry that such costs, including filing fees and the arbitrator's fees, 
will deter employees subject to an arbitration agreement from 
pursuing their claims against their employer. 171  High-level employees,
however, who tend to be highly compensated and to have more
financially at stake in employment litigation, are less likely to be
deterred by such costs from pursuing their employment claims in
arbitration. 172
High-level employees also are less likely than low-level employees to
be disadvantaged by the repeat player effect. 173 They are likely to have
note 12,  at 2 1 1 -12  (reporting on her empirical study which found that white collar
employees win in arbitration more frequently and recover more of what they demand
in arbitration than do blue or pink collar employees) . This may reflect greater
bargaining power in setting the procedures for arbitration, or it may reflect any
number of factors such as the greater likelihood that the white collar employee will
have a for cause employment contract. See Bingham, Adhesive Contracts, supra note
12,  at 235 (hypothesizing that highly compensated white collar employees may do
better in employment arbitration than blue collar workers because they are more
likely to be able to negotiate fixed term of employment or other employment
protections) . 
169 Cj. Gorman, supra note 6 1 ,  at 650 (suggesting that employee'S lower level status
should be relevant to enforceability of predispute employment arbitration agreement
entered into by employee) .
170 See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 166, at 244, 267 (noting that average CEO in
their empirical study of employment contracts for CEOs of S&P 1500 companies
"earns a base salary of $643,212" and that " [mlean total compensation is $ 1 .65
million") .  
1 7 1  See supra notes 68 70 and accompanying text.
1 72 Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317  F.3d 646, 665 (6th Cif. 2003)
(discussing how cost splitting provision in employment arbitration agreement may be
enforceable against high level managerial employee but not against other employees
given that "in many cases, . . .  high level managerial employees and others with
substantial means can afford the costs of arbitration"); see also Armendariz v. Found.
Health Psychcare Servs. ,  Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 699 (Cal. 2000) (Brown, ] . ,  concurring)
(criticizing majority for ignoring fact that " [nlot all arbitrations are costly, and not all
employees are unable to afford the unique costs of arbitration [and thusl the
imposition of some arbitral costs does not deter or discourage employees from 
pursuing their statutory claims in every case") .  
173 For a discussion of the repeat player effect, see supra notes 75-81 and
accompanying text.
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630 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
higher-value claims. 174 Consequently, they are more likely to be able to
obtain competent counsel to represent them in pursuing those
claims. 175 The participation of an experienced plaintiffs employment
lawyer will militate against a repeat-player advantage in arbitration,
which the employer might otherwise enjoy. 176 Experienced plaintiffs
counsel will tend to be familiar with a roster of potential employment
arbitrators, or at least will tend to realize the value of becoming so
familiar. Consequently, plaintiffs counsel will be able to strategically
select arbitrators. Moreover, for that reason, arbitrators will tend to
view plaintiffs counsel as a potential source of future employment just
as they might view a repeat player employer as a potential source of
future employment.
Finally, a statute that prohibits enforcement of predispute
employment arbitration agreements containing an exception based on
1 74 Estreicher, Satums for Rickshaws, supra note 59, at 563 ("The people who
benefit under a litigation-based system are those whose salaries are high enough to
warrant the costs and risks of a law suit undertaken by competent counsel.").
175 See id. ; cj. Fitzgibbon, supra note 59, at 1412 (asserting that " [l Jower wage
earners also are likely to have difficulty finding an attorney to represent them because
attorneys simply cannot afford to take to court cases with only a small potential for 
recovery" but speculating that " [a l ttorneys may be more willing to represent
employees in arbitration" because it is less expensive to bring arbitrated case to
hearing) ; Maltby, supra note 63, at 57 (noting that " [elven if the [employeel has
clearly been wronged and is virtually certain to prevail in court, the attorney will be
forced to turn down the case unless there are substantial damages"); St. Antoine, supra
note 1, at 791-92 (positing that some workers with meritorious but low value
employment claim will be unable to obtain first rate lawyer to represent them because
potential dollar recovery would not justify that lawyer'S investment of time and money
in case).
176 See Colvin, supra note 12 ,  at 43 1 ,  433 34 (speculating that " [al factor that
should reduce the likelihood of a repeat employer arbitrator effect emerging is the
potential role of plaintiffs counsel as a repeat player in the system," and concluding
from his own empirical study that "win rate for unrepresented employees whose cases
are decided by arbitrators who are involved in multiple arbitration cases with that
same employer is strikingly low and raises particular concerns about the danger of
repeat player bias for the more vulnerable employee who does not have representation
by counsel"); Estreicher, Satums for Rickshaws, supra note 59, at 566 (arguing with
respect to repeat player effect that "the emergence of an organized plaintiffs bar, in
the form of the National Employment Lawyers Association, should drive down
considerably any claimed systematic advantage for employers") ;  Galanter, supra note
75, at 1 1 8  (concluding that " [ tl he existence of a specialized bar on the [ one-shot
playerl side should overcome the gap in expertise" between repeat players and one­
shot players, but also concluding that existence of such specialized bar would not
overcome other "fundamental strategic advantages of [repeat playersl - their capaCity
to structure the transaction, play the odds, and influence rule development and
enforcement policy"); St. Antoine, supra note 1 ,  at 789 (asserting that "the repeat­
player effect will diminish with the increasing growth of a plaintiffs claimants bar").
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 63 1
the status of the employee will safeguard the public interest function
of employment litigation - principally, promoting the elimination of
invidious employment discrimination. Under such a prohibition, the
vast majority of all employment discrimination claims that are
adjudicated will be litigated in court. Such litigation will greatly serve
the general deterrence, law development, and norm development and
reinforcement functions that concern critics of employment
arbitration. 177
Thus, several of the purported drawbacks of arbitration arising from
a predispute employment arbitration agreement are minimized in the
context of a dispute between an employer and a high-level employee.
Further, several of the benefits of employment arbitration are most
pronounced in this context. A high-level employee is relatively more
likely to be the type of employee with whom the employer would
especially wish to salvage a beneficial employment relationship.
Further, litigation with a high-level employee has a relatively greater
likelihood of seriously disrupting the workplace and exacting an
emotional toll on fellow employees. 1 78 This type of litigation also is 
relatively more likely to involve sensitive or confidential information
that the employer, the employee, and coworkers would like to keep
private. 179 Thus, employers, employee disputants, and coworkers
should especially prize the speedy and private resolution of this type
of dispute. ISO 
In sum, high-level employees are less likely, compared to low-level
employees, to be disadvantaged by arbitration arising from predispute
employment arbitration agreements, and employers should most
177 See Gilmer v. InterstateZJohnson Lane, SOD U.s. 20, 32 ( 199 1 ) ;  Gorman, supra
note 6 1 ,  at 668-69 (dismissing concerns that employment arbitration will retard
development of employment discrimination law given that court decisions will
comprise majority of adversary dispositions of employment discrimination claims); St.
Antoine, supra note 1 ,  at 789 (commenting that " [t lhe notion that the use of
arbitration will inhibit the development of a body of judicial doctrine on workplace
discrimination seems highly suspect in light of the very large caseload of the federal
courts in this area").
178 See Yarkon, supra note 60, at 1 7 1  n.30 (noting that "the cost of such
interruptions [to the workplace caused by depositions attendant to employment
litigationl is particularly high in the case of managers").
179 See Schwab &1 Thomas, supra note 1 66, at 238 (noting that employers would
view arbitration clause in CEO employment contract as desirable "to keep matters
private, and thereby avoid adverse publicity over a messy termination and possible
public litigation").
180 See id. at 258 (concluding from review of 375 CEO contracts that " [ elven
CEOs, who are generally employees with considerable bargaining power, seem willing
to bind themselves to arbitrate contractual disputes").
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632 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
highly value arbitration when the disputant is a high-level employee.
Therefore, even if Congress proscribes enforcement of predispute
arbitration agreements as they relate to all types of employment law
claims, Congress should carve out an exception from the prohibition
for certain high-level employees. lSI 
B. How Best to Distinguish Between High-Level Employees and Low­
Level Employees
In considering how best to structure an exception for high-level
employees to a prohibition on enforcement of predispute employment
arbitration agreements, several considerations are paramount. Of
primary importance, the exception should be crafted to minimize
litigation over who qualifies for the exception. An arbitration
gatekeeping standard that breeds litigation would conflict with the
central goal of arbitration - expeditious adjudication of the dispute
that will save the disputants both time and money. IS2
Thus, in a way that minimizes litigation, the exception first should
separate out the employees who are most likely to have sufficient
bargaining leverage and sophistication as well as sufficient financial
resources that they will be able to effectively bargain with their
employer for a procedurally fair arbitration and afford any costs
unique to arbitration. Second, the exception should separate out the
employees with whom employers would most desire to have an
arbitration agreement. These should be the employees who are most
critical to the success of their employer's business such that the
employer would want to maximize the possibility of maintaining a
beneficial employment relationship with the employee and to
minimize the possibility of disruption to the business that would be
caused by protracted and public litigation with the employee. Finally,
the size of the class of employees falling within the exception should
be such as to have no more than a de minimus effect on the public
goals that animate employment discrimination litigation. These goals
include deterrence of invidious discrimination, development of the
law of employment discrimination, and norm development and
reinforcement with respect to the discrimination ban.
Congress has distinguished between high-level and low-level
employees in several federal employment statutes. This Article's
181 Cf Speidel, supra note 1 ,  at 1 093 (proposing reforms to govern arbitration
agreement in adhesion contract between employer and employee and defining
employee to exclude "an executive officer of a corporation").
182 See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 633
proposed exemption borrows concepts from three of these statutes:
the ADEA's exemptions for "bona fide executives" and "high
policymaking employees" ;  the FMLA's exemption concerning "highly
compensated" employees; and the NLRA's exclusion of "supervisors."
One virtue of borrowing concepts from existing statutes is  that there is
an accompanying existing body of case law that elaborates on the
meaning and application of the borrowed concepts. This should
reduce uncertainty and litigation arising from a new standard. This
Article discusses each of these existing standards below, before
turning to the details of the proposed exclusion.
1 .  The ADEA's Exemption for "Bona Fide Executives" and "High
Policymaking Employees"
The ADEA prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age
against persons who are at least forty years old. 183 This legislation
provides a narrow exception to the discrimination prohibition for
certain "bona fide executives" and "high policymaking employees."
Section l2(c) of the ADEA provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit
compulsory retirement of any employee who has attained 65 
years of age, and who, for the 2-year period immediately
before retirement, is employed in a bona fide executive or a
high policymaking position, if such employee is entitled to an
immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from a
pension, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred compensation
plan, or any combination of such plans, of the employer of
such employee which equals, in the aggregate, at least
$44,000. 184 
Section l2(c)'s legislative history suggests that Congress added the
bona fide executive and high policymaking employee exemptions
because of "concerns . . . regarding the impact that the elimination of
183 29 U.s.C §§ 623(a), 63 l (a) (2000).
184 29 U.s.C § 63 l (c)(l ) . The employer that would be free to force such an
employee to retire at or after the age of 65 may instead retain the employee in a lesser
or part-time status. 29 CF.R. § 1625 . 1 2(c) ( 1988); see Koprowski v. Wistar lnst. of
Anatomy and Biology, 819 F. Supp. 410,  414 (£.0. Pa. 1992). The employer, however,
may not otherwise treat the employee less favorably than a younger employee on
account of his age. 29 CF.R. § 1625. 12(c). If the employee holds more than one
pOSition with the employer in the two years immediately prior to retirement, each
position must be a bona fide executive or high policyrnaking pOSition for the
exemption to apply. 29 CF.R. § 1625. 12(f).
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634 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591 
mandatory retirement would have on the ability of employers to
assure promotional opportunities for younger workers. " 185
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC")
interpretive regulations elaborate on both the bona fide executive and
high policymaking employee exceptions. 186 With respect to the bona
fide executive exemption, the regulations provide that in order for the
employer to show that its employee qualifies as a "bona fide 
executive," the employer must first show that the employee meets the
definition of a bona fide executive set out in the regulations for the
FLSA.187 The employer further must show that the employee is not a
185 S. REP. No. 95-493, at 7 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S. C C A. N  504, 510; cJ.
Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp . ,  567 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd,
742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984) (suggesting that rationale for high policymaking
employee exemption was "the importance of avoiding staleness in the formulation of
policy") .  
186 See generally 29 CF .R. § 1625 . 1 2  (2009).
187 Id. § 1625 . 12(d)(1) . The EEOC's regulations on the section 1 2(c) exemption
expressly refer to and incorporate "the definition of a bona fide executive set forth in §
54 1 . 1  of [ 29 CF.R. J . "  Id. 29 CF.R. § 541 . 1  used to contain the FLSA's definition of a
bona fide executive and used to provide that a bona fide executive is an employee:
(a) Whose primary duty consists of the management of the enterprise in
which he is employed or of a customarily recognized department or
subdivision thereof; and
(b) Who customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other
employees therein; and
(c) Who has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose
suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring or firing and as to the
advancement and promotion or any other change of status of other
employees will be given particular weight; and
(d) Who customarily and regularly exercises discretionary powers; and
(e) Who does not devote more than 20 percent, or in the case of an
employee of a retail or service establishment who does not devote as much
as 40 percent, of his hours of work in the workweek to activities which are
not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in
paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section: Provided, that this paragraph
shall not apply in the case of an employee who is in sole charge of an
independent establishment or a phYSically separated branch establishment,
or who owns at least a 20 percent interest in the enterprise in which he is
employed. . . .  
29 C.F.R. § 541 . 1  ( 1973) (repealed 2004). Section 541 was revised, however, effective
August 23 , 2004, so that section 541 . 1  no longer contains a definition of "bona fide
executive." See 69 Fed. Reg. 221 22-01 (Apr. 23, 2004). The definition of "bona fide 
executive" contained in the revised FLSA regulations differs significantly from the
definition contained in the former regulations, but essentially retains the elements
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 635
mere "middle-management employed ] "  but rather is a "top level
employed ] who exercise rs] substantial executive authority over a
significant number of employees and a large volume of business." 188
Thus, the regulations suggest that the head of a major legal
department, for example, may qualify as a bona fide executive. 189 One
court, however, held that an employer's chief labor counsel was not a
bona fide executive after finding that he "had little executive
responsibility," but rather "was primarily an attorney doing legal
work, giving legal advice, giving attention to the effect of statutes,
regulations and administrative action upon company practices , and
attending to litigation." 190
With respect to the high policymaking position exemption, the
exemption is limited to certain top level employees "who have little or
no line authority but whose position and responsibility are such that
contained in former section 541 . 1  (a)-(c). See 29 CF.R. § 541 . 100 (2009).
188 29 CF.R. § 1 625. 1 2(d)(2). The regulations adopt and quote from the legislative
history of the exception:
"Typically, the head of a significant and substantial local or regional
operation of a corporation [or other business organization! , such as a major
production facility or retail establishment, but not the head of a minor
branch, warehouse or retail store, would be covered by the term 'bona fide
executive.' Individuals at higher levels in the corporate organizational
structure who possess comparable or greater levels of responsibility and
authority as measured by established and recognized criteria would also be
covered. 
. . . With respect to employees whose duties are associated with corporate
headquarters operations, such as finance, marketing, legal, production and
manufacturing (or in a corporation organized on a product line basis, the
management of product lines) , the definition would cover employees who
head those divisions."  
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No.  95-950, at  9 ( 1978) (Conf. Rep.)) .  
The Conference Report and regulations also make clear that the immediate
subordinates of division heads fall within the exemption provided that they "possess
responsibility which is comparable to or greater than that possessed by the head of a
significant and substantial local operation who meets the definition." ld.
189 29 CF.R. § 1625 . 1 2(d)(2); see also Breckenridge v. Bristol-Myers Co., 43 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1 0 1 1 ,  1013 (S.D. Ind. 1 987) (concluding that "in light of
[employee's] position as head of the Mead Johnson Legal Department, plaintiff falls 
within the ADEA exemption for holders of bona fide executive positions").
190 Whittlesey, 567 F. Supp. at 1322, 1323. Nor was the in house lawyer a high
policymaker where the court found that although his work "extended beyond mere
interpretation of legal requirements and did touch on questions of policy, he was not
looked to for Significant contributions to the formulation of policy" at the company,
nor did he have "access to the high policy making levels of management." Id. at 1322,
1324.
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636 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
they play a significant role in the development of corporate policy and
effectively recommend the implementation thereof." 191 Thus, an
employee who does not meet the definition of a bona fide executive
under the FLSA regulations may still qualify for the section l 2(c)
exemption if he plays a significant role as a policymaker. 192 The
regulations cite as an example an employer's chief economist or chief
scientist charged with the responsibility of developing and
recommending "policy direction" to the employer's top management
and who "would have a significant impact on the ultimate decision on
such policies by virtue of his expertise and direct access to the
decisionmakers." 193 Accordingly, where the employee was an executive
vice president for corporate affairs who "had direct access to the
[ employer's] top decisionmakers, . . .  was responsible for evaluating
significant legislative and regulatory trends and issues and working
with legislators on these issues, and . . .  recommended policy on
acqmsltlons and mergers, capitalization, and other areas of
importance" to the employer, one court found that the employee
qualified as a high policymaker. 194 
It is notable that courts generally consider an employee's salary
relative to the salaries of the employer's other employees a relevant
and often important factor in deciding whether the employee is a bona
fide executive or holds a high policymaking position under section
1 2 (c) . 195 Courts view the employee's relative salary as an important
191 29 CF.R. § 1625.l2(e) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-950, at 10 (1978) (Con£. Rep.» .
192 Breckenridge, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1 0 1 7.
193 29 CF.R. § 1625 .l2(e) . The regulations make clear that the high policymaking
employee's support staff would not qualify for the exemption regardless of whether
the support staff member drafted policy recommendations or supervised the
development of such recommendations. ld.
194 Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, 54 F.3d 27, 33 ( 1st Cir. 1995)
(quoting district court) .
195 See id. at 29 (noting that ADEA plaintiff and asserted high policymaker was
employer's fifth highest paid employee) ; Passer v. Am. Chemical Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322,
328 (D.C Cir. 199 1 )  (noting that ADEA plaintiffs "salary ranked him as [ the
employerl 's tenth highest paid employee out of a total work force of 1 ,900" and
concluding based in part on this fact that employee was bona fide executive for 
purposes of section l2(c) exemption); Colby v. Graniteville Co. ,  635 F. Supp. 381,
385 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (" [T lhe level of compensation . . .  is one of a number of factors
to consider [in determining whether the employee is a bona fide executivel espeCially
where . . . high pay is accompanied by perquisites of office limited to a few
individuals.");  Whittlesey, 567 F. Supp. at 1322, 1326 (" [Hl igh or low pay can be
relevant, and often compelling evidence, as to an employee's executive or
policymaking importance.") ;  Breckenridge, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1015 
(citing as factor in support of its finding that plaintiff was bona fide executive under
section l2(c) that " [hle was highly compensated, especially in comparison to others at
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 637
factor because it often speaks to the importance that the employer
places on the employee's job. 196 Salary, however, is less important in
the calculus than other factors that speak more directly to the
employee's job functions and responsibilities. 197 According to one
court: "High pay is not determinative as to whether a position comes
within the bona fide executive or high policymaker exemption. The
test is one of function, not of pay. " 198
The ADEA's bona fide executive and high policymaking employee
are precisely the types of employee that should be exempt from any
legislation prohibiting enforcement of predispute employment
arbitration agreements. They are, by definition, critical employees who
play a key role in the planning or operation of the employer's business.
Further, they very likely possess both bargaining leverage and
sophistication sufficient to protect themselves from being bullied by
their employer into a fundamentally unfair employment arbitration
process.
Unfortunately, the gUidelines in the EEOC's regulations for
determining who qualifies as a bona fide executive or high
policymaking employee are too uncertain to serve as a gatekeeping
standard for arbitration. As set forth below, this Article seeks to
implement the concept of a bona fide executive or high policymaking
employee by means of a gross but more certain approximation.
Borrowing from the case law interpreting the ADEA's section l 2Cc)
exemption, the proposed exemption relies heavily on the employee's
compensation as a proxy for the employee'S importance to his
employer as well as his sophistication and bargaining leverage. The
FMLA's exemption for "certain highly compensated employees" 199
from its reinstatement requirement is informative.
[ the employer] and in comparison to his subordinates in [his d] epartment, and had
perquisites available only to a few persons") .
196 Whittlesey, 567 F. Supp. at 1322, 1326-27 ("The salary accorded to [plaintiffj's
position no doubt measures the importance of that function to [ the employer] .  ") 
1 9 7  See Colby, 635 F. Supp. at 385 (finding that for purposes of court's determining
whether plaintiff was bona fide executive within purview of section l 2(c), nature of
employee'S job responsibilities were " [  0] f even more compelling force" than level of
employee's compensation); Whittlesey, 567 F. Supp. at 1322, 1326 27 (employee's
salary, while "relevant, and often compelling" piece of evidence for court to consider
"does not measure whether the attributes and responsibilities of the position involve
executive or high policymaking functions"). 
1 9 8  Whittlesey, 567 F. Supp. at 1322, 1326.
199 See 29 U.s.c. § 2614(b) (2006) . 
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638 University of California, Davis
2.  The FMLA's Exemption Concerning Certain Highly
Compensated Employees
[Vol. 43:591 
The FMLA provides that "an eligible employee shall be entitled to a
total of 1 2  workweeks of leave during any 1 2-month period" to care
for the employee's newborn child or adjust after the placement with
the employee of a newly adopted child. Additionally, employees are
entitled to this leave to care for the employee's spouse, child, or parent
if this relative "has a serious health condition," or because of the
employee's own "serious health condition that makes the employee
unable to perform the functions of the [employee's] position."20o The
FMLA protects an employee who exercises his right to take FMLA
leave by providing that when the employee returns from leave, he is
entitled to be restored to his former or an equivalent position with
equivalent pay and benefits.20! The employer may deny "certain highly
compensated employees" such restoration, however, if "such denial is
necessary to prevent substantial and grievous economic injury to the
operations of the employer." 202
The FMLA defines a "highly compensated employee" for the
purposes of the restoration exemption as "a salaried eligible employee
who is among the highest paid 10 percent of the employees employed
by the employer within 75 miles of the facility at which the employee
is employed. ,,203 Thus, the FMLA's definition of a highly compensated
employee enables a court to determine that an employee falls outside
the bounds of the reinstatement exemption with near mathematical
precision. For this reason, this Article's proposed exemption from a
statute prohibiting enforcement of predispute employment arbitration
agreements borrows and modifies the FMLA's "highly compensated
200 Id. § 2612(a) ( l) (C), (D) (2006). 
201 Id. § 2614(a)(l)(A) , (B). 
202 Id. § 2614(b) ( l ) (A); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(c) (2009). The employer must
notify the employee of its intent to deny restoration as soon as the employer
determines that restoration would cause such injury. 29 U.s.c. § 2614(b)(l)(B) . The
Department of Labor's regulations implementing this section of the FMLA emphasize
that the restoration of the employee to employment, rather than the absence of the
employee from her employment, must be the cause of the substantial and grievous
economic injury. 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(a) (2009).
203 29 U .s.c. § 2614(b)(2) ; see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.21 7(a) (2009). The
Department of Labor's regulations implementing this provision of the FMLA provide
that the determination of whether or not an employee is among the highest paid 10 
percent of  the employees employed within 75 miles of the employee's worksite "shall
be made at the time the employee gives notice of the need for leave." 29 C.F.R. §
825 .21 7(c) (2).
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 639
employee" test as a means to help approximate the concept of a bona
fide executive or high policymaking employee.
The second part of the FMLA's reinstatement exemption, the
"grievous economic injury" test, is less exact. The Department of
Labor's regulations implementing this section of the FMLA elaborate
on the meaning of "substantial and grievous economic injury." The
regulations prOVide:
If the reinstatement of a "key employee" threatens the
economic viability of the firm, that would constitute
"substantial and grievous economic injury." A lesser injury
which causes substantial, long-term economic injury would
also be sufficient. Minor inconveniences and costs that the
employer would experience in the normal course of doing
business would certainly not constitute "substantial and
grievous economic injury."204
The FMLA regulations and case law suggest that an employer can
demonstrate that it would suffer substantial and grievous economic
injury if it were required to reinstate a highly compensated employee
even if the employee does not play any role in the development of
corporate policy. Rather, the critical factor appears to be whether the
employee played a key role in the successful operation of the
employer's business and, thus, whether permanent replacement of the
employee during his or her absence is unavoidable. 205 Thus, one
district court found that a hotel's executive housekeeper, who was
responsible for supervising the hotel's other housekeepers, qualified
204 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(c). 
205 See Kephart v. Cherokee County, 52 F. Supp. 2d 607, 610 1 1  (W.D.N.C. 1999) ,
rev'd on other grounds, 229 F.3d 1 142 (4th Cir. 2000) (focusing on county employer's
need to get tax bills out on time, plaintiff employee's critical role in this process, and
difficulties that would be caused if county employer hired temporary assessor to fill in
for plaintiff while he was on FMLA leave);  29 C.F.R. § 825.218(b) ("If permanent
replacement is unavoidable, the cost of then reinstating the employee can be
considered in evaluating whether substantial and grievous economic injury will occur
from restoration.") .  The regulations and cases make clear that the critical issue is 
whether restoration itself would cause substantial and grievous economic injury,
rather than whether the employee's absence would do so. See O'Grady v. Catholic
Health Partners Serv., No. 00 C 7144, 2002 WL 221583, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13,
2002); 29 C.F.R. § 825.218(a). The extent of injury caused by the employee's absence
is surely relevant, however, to whether permanent replacement is unavoidable. See 
Kephart, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 6 1 1  (noting in finding that employer had demonstrated that
reinstatement would cause it substantial and grievous economic injury that "the
Plaintiff could not have chosen, had he done so, a more inconvenient time for medical
leave").
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640 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
for the FMLA's reinstatement exclusion.206 The court based this
conclusion principally on the finding that "it is important for [ the
viability of the defendant employer's] hoteH ] to have rooms properly
cleaned and available on a timely basis for [its] guests. ,, 207 The court
further found that the employer had "made an educated business
decision" when it decided to permanently replace the plaintiff while
she was on leave, and could not afford to retain both the plaintiff and
her permanent replacement as executive housekeepers at their full
salaries. 208
To the extent that the "grievous economic injury" test focuses on
the employee's key role in the operation of the employer's business,
the concept might be helpful in identifying the type of employee who
should be exempted from the protections of a statute invalidating
predispute employment arbitration agreements . The test is too
ambiguous, however, to serve a gatekeeping function in arbitration.
Indeed, the regulations implementing the FMLA evidence the
uncertainty arising from the substantial and grievous economic injury
test, conceding that " [a ]  precise test cannot be set for the level of
hardship or injury to the employer which must be sustained."209 A
more precise test is exactly what is needed, however, to screen out
employees from the prohibition on enforcement of predispute
employment arbitration agreements. For that greater precision, this
Article's proposal borrows from the FMLA's highly compensated
employee test, discussed above, and the NLRA's more objective
exclusion of "supervisors" from its collective bargaining protections,
discussed next.
3. The NLRA's Exclusion of "Supervisors"
The NLRA provides employees with the right to self-organization
and the right to engage in collective bargaining free from interference
by an employer.210 It further provides that for the purposes of these
rights, the term "employee" shall not include "any individual
206 See Oby v. Baton Rouge Marriott, 329 F. Supp. 2d 772, 782-83 (M.D. La. 2004).
207 [d. at 776 n.10; see also id. at 783 (citing as evidence that employer would suffer
substantial and grievous economic harm from reinstating employee "undisputed
evidence . . .  that plaintiff was relied upon as the Executive Housekeeper . . .  to keep
the facilities clean and [the] customers happy"); id. at 787 (stating defendant
employer had to replace plaintiff employee "or the continued successful operation and
viability of the [defendant employer'S hotel] would be questionable").
208 Id. at 783, 787. 
209 29 C.F.R. § 825.2 18(c).
210 29 U.s.c. §§ 157, 158(a) (2006). 
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 641
employed as a supervisor."2 1 1  Section 152 of the NLRA presents a
twelve-factor definition identifying a "supervisor" as: 
[A] ny individual having authority, in the interest of the
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with
the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment.212 
Congress intended for this definition of "supervisor" to distinguish
between employees with minor supervisory duties and those
supervisors traditionally regarded as part of management.213 The latter
are those "vested with such genuine management prerogatives as the
right to hire or fire, discipline, or make effective recommendations
with respect to such action" and, therefore,  owe management their
undivided loyalty.214 Indeed:
Congress wanted to ensure that employers would not be
deprived of the undivided loyalty of their supervisory foremen. 
Congress was concerned that if supervisors were allowed to
affiliate with labor organizations that represented the rank and
file, they might become accountable to the workers, thus,
interfering with the supervisors' ability to discipline and
control the employees in the interest of the employer.215
2 l l  Id. § 152(3) (2006). 
m Id. § 152( 1 l).
213 NLRB v. Health Care &: Retirement Corp. , 5 1 1  U .S. 571 , 589 (1994) (Ginsburg,
) . , dissenting) ; S. REP. NO. 105, at 4 5 (1947).
214 Health Care & Retirement Corp. , 5 1 1  U.S. at 589.
215 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ. , 444 U .s. 672, 695 (1980) (Brennan, ) . ,  dissenting) ; H .R.
REP. No. 245, at 14 (1947). Congress also "sought to protect the rank and file
employees from being unduly influenced in their selection of leaders by the presence
of management representatives in their union."  Yeshiva Univ. , 444 U.S. at 695.
By judicial decision, "managerial employees" also are excluded from the NLRA's
self organization and collective bargaining protections. Health Care & Retirement
Corp. , 5 1 1  U.s. at 576-77; NlRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 4 1 6  U.s. 267, 275, 289 ( 1974).
The Supreme Court has defined "managerial employees" as "those who 'formulate and
effectuate management poliCies by expressing and making operative the decisions of
their employer.' " Bell Aerospace Co. , 416 U.s. at 288. A managerial employee must be
aligned with management. Yeshiva Univ. , 444 U.s. at 683. The Court has elaborated
that " [o lnly if an employee's activities fall outside the scope of the duties routinely
performed by similarly situated profeSSionals will he be found aligned with
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642 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43 :591
The NLRA's "supervisor" test is broader than the employee
exclusion appropriate for a statute invalidating predispute
employment arbitration agreements. Too many employees who would
meet the NLRA supervisor test would nevertheless lack the bargaining
leverage and sophistication needed to effectively bargain with their
employer over the terms of an arbitration agreement. In addition, too
many NLRA supervisors with modest financial resources might be
deterred from asserting their claims in arbitration by the costs unique
to arbitration. Finally, the class of NLRA supervisors seems too large
and too removed from upper management to exempt the class from a
prohibition on enforcement of predispute employment arbitration
agreements if a purpose of the prohibition is to safeguard the public
goals of employment discrimination litigation.216 If the criticisms of
employment arbitration relating to the public goals of employment
discrimination litigation have any force, then a statute invalidating
predispute employment arbitration agreements but nevertheless
permitting removal of any supervisor's discrimination claims from the
public courts is too narrow.
These objections to using the NLRA supervisor test to exempt
employees from a statute invalidating predispute employment
arbitration agreements lose their force ,  however, when the supervisor
test is combined with a stringent compensation standard, such as the
FMLA's highly compensated employee test. The NLRA supervisor test
then becomes useful for the proposed exemption, so long as the test is
modified to remove several ambiguous criteria. Specifically, the last
two of the twelve factors set out in the NLRA definition of supervisor
management." ld. at 690. Moreover, "normally, an employee may be excluded as
managerial only if he represents management interests by taking or recommending
discretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer policy." ld. at
683. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has held that the faculty of a university
were managerial employees where the faculty exercised absolute authOrity in academic
matters including determining course offerings, teaching methods, grading policies,
and matriculation standards. ld. at 686. "To the extent the industrial analogy applies,
the faculty determines within each school the product to be produced, the terms upon
which it will be offered, and the customers who will be served."  ld.
The managerial employee exception grows out of the same concern as the
supervisory employee exception: Both exceptions are grounded in the belief that the
"employer is entitled to the undivided loyalty of its representatives."  ld. at 682; see
also id. at 695 (Brennan, J . ,  dissenting) (stating that " [i l dentical considerations
underlie the exclusion of managerial employees" and supervisory employees). The
managerial exception, however, like the ADEA's bona fide executive and high
policymaking employee exceptions, seems insufficiently objective to serve as a
gatekeeping standard for arbitration.
216 See infra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 643
- "responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances" - seem
too amorphous to be appropriate for an arbitration gatekeeping
standard.217 Accordingly, these two factors should be excluded from 
any proposed arbitration gatekeeping standard.
In addition, the use of the term "independent judgment" in the
NLRA's supervisor test gives rise to ambiguity.218 In particular, it is
unclear how much discretion or independent judgment will suffice to
support a finding that the employee acted as a supervisor.219 Thus, any
exemption should not include this prong of the NLRA supervisor test.
The deletion, however, could potentially render the exemption too
broad. As the Supreme Court has noted, "Many nominally supervisory
functions may be performed without the exercise of such a degree
of . . .  judgment or discretion . . .  as would warrant a finding of
supervisory status under the [NLRA ] . "no Thus, when the employer
has issued detailed orders to the employee with respect to the exercise
of a nominally supervisory function, the employee is less likely to be
exercising sufficient "independent judgment" to qualify for the NLRA
supervisory exemption.221 Combining the NLRA supervisor test with a
high compensation standard, however, alleviates this concern. In
effect, this Article's proposed exemption utilizes the employee's high
compensation as a proxy for independent judgment. This Article turns
now to a discussion of the details of the proposed exemption for
217 See NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. ,  532 U.s. 706, 726 (2001) (Stevens, j . ,
dissenting) (commenting that term "responsibly to direct" is  ambiguous) ; Health Care
& Retirement Corp., 5 1 1  U.S. at 579 (agreeing with National Labor Relations Board's
assertion that "phrases in [29 U.s. C ]  § [ 1 5 ] 2 ( 1 1) such as 'independent judgment' and
'responsibly to direct' are ambiguous") ;  id. at 585 (Ginsburg, ] . ,  dissenting) (noting
that " [i ]  f the term 'supervisor' is construed broadly, to reach everyone with any
authority to use 'independent judgment' to assign and 'responsibly . . .  direct' the work
of other employees, then most professionals would be supervisors, for most have some
authority to assign and direct others' work," but such broad exclusion would be
inconsistent with Congress's inclusion of profeSSionals within NLRA's protections).
But see Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N .L.R.B. 686, 690-92 (2006) (attempting to
clarify National Labor Relations Board's interpretation of definition of "responsibly to
direct" as that term is set forth in section 2(1 1) of NLRA). 
218 Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.s. at 713; id. at 725 (Stevens, j . , dissenting)
(commenting that " [t ]he term 'independent judgment' is indisputably ambiguous").
But see Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N .L.R.B. at 692-94 (attempting to clarify National
Labor Relations Board's interpretation of definition of "independentjudgment" as that
term is set forth in section 2(1 1) of NLRA) .
219 Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. , 532 U.s. at 713 (" [ I l t  is certainly true that the
statutory term 'independent judgment' is ambiguous with respect to the degree of
discretion required for supervisOry status.") .  
220 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
2 2 1  Id. at 7 13-14.
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644 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
distinguishing sufficiently high-level employees for the purposes of
exempting these employees from legislation invalidating predispute
employment arbitration agreements.
4. A Proposal to Distinguish High-Level Employees for the
Purpose of Exempting Such Employees from Any Legislation
Invalidating Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements
This Article's proposed exemption for key employees from a statute
prohibiting enforcement of predispute employment arbitration
agreements has five elements. First, an employer would be able to
designate certain employees as exempt from such a prohibition. As 
detailed below, under the proposed exemption, the employer would be
able to irrebuttably designate certain employees from a small class as
exempt, and rebuttably designate certain other employees from a larger
but still limited class as exempt. In total, the employer would be able to
designate up to ten percent of its employees as exempt. This element
exempts from the prohibition those employees who are most critical to
the employer, similar to the ADEA's exemptions for bona fide 
executives and high policymaking employees.222 Presumably, the
employer knows best which of its employees are most important. The
proposed exemption, therefore, would allow the employer to decide for
itself who its most key employees are among those in a limited group.
Second, an employer would be able to designate a certain employee
as exempt only if that employee is among the highest paid twenty
percent of the employees employed by the employer within seventy­
five miles of the facility at which the employee is employed. The
proposed exemption uses the employee's high compensation as a
proxy for his importance to the employer, to help ensure that the
employer deSignates only those employees who are its key employees,
as opposed to those employees against whom the employer might
most like to discriminate. The proposed exemption also uses the
employee's high compensation as a proxy for sufficient employee
bargaining power and sophistication, to help ensure that the
exemption does not undermine the concerns that ground the
prohibition on enforcement of predispute employment arbitration
agreements in the first place. Finally, relating salary to the universe of
employees within seventy-five miles of the employee'S worksite
controls for cost-of-living distortions in compensation. This element
recognizes that an employer may pay an employee employed in New
York City more than it pays its more critical employee employed in
222 See supra Part III.B . l .  
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 645
Atlanta merely because New York City has a higher cost of living than
Atlanta.
Third, if an employee is among the highest paid five percent of the
employer's employees within seventy-five miles of the employee's
facility, the employee would not be able to rebut his employer's
designation of him as exempt. The employer's designation in such
cases would be final. This element of the exemption maximizes
deference to the employer when the employee is most likely to be one
of the employer's key employees. Additionally, it minimizes litigation
over the exempt status of the employee in a large number of cases of
greatest importance to the employer.
Fourth, if an employee is among the highest paid twenty percent but
not among the highest paid five percent of the employer's employees
within seventy-five miles of the employee's facility, the employee
would be able to rebut his employer's designation of him as exempt.
To do so, the employee would have to demonstrate that at the relevant
time, the employee was not an individual having authority, in the
interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
effectively to recommend such action. This standard is a modified
version of the NLRA supervisor test. 223 It deletes the less objective
elements of "responsibly to direct" and "to adjust their grievances,"224
and the ambiguous term "independent judgment." This element
allows the employee to demonstrate that despite his relatively high
compensation, he did not exercise the responsibilities that we would
expect a key employee to exercise.
The proposal allows the employee to demonstrate that he did not
meet the requirements of the test at the time he and the employer
contracted to arbitrate future disputes. The time of contracting is
relevant because that is when the relative bargaining power of the
parties matters most. The proposal also allows the employee to
demonstrate that he did not meet the requirements of the test at the
earlier of the time his employment with the employer terminated or
the time the employer sought to compel arbitration. The time of
enforcement is relevant because the purpose of the exemption is to
allow the employer to force only key employees to arbitrate. Where
m See supra Part IlI.B.3.
224 See Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc. ,  532 U.S. at 728 (Stevens, j. , dissenting) ( " [ O ] f  
[ the 1 2  NLRA supervisory employee functions] ,  i t  is only 'responsibly t o  direct' that is
ambiguous and thus capable of swallowing the whole if not narrowly construed. The
authority to 'promote' or 'discharge,' to use only two examples, is specific and readily
identifiable. In contrast, the authority 'responsibly to direct' is far more vague."). 
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646 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
the employer seeks to compel a former employee to arbitrate, the
employee's circumstances at the time of his termination should be
considered because the test cannot sensibly be applied to the current
circumstances of a former employee, given that the former employee is
no longer employed at a facility of the employer or being compensated
by the employer.
Finally, an employer would be able to designate an employee as
irrebuttably or rebuttably exempt only at the time the employer and
the employee enter into a predispute arbitration agreement. This
element of the proposal prevents the employer from manipulating the
system by designating an employee as exempt once the employer
knows or suspects that litigation with the employee is likely.225
However, an employer would be able to revoke a designation of an
employee as exempt at any time after contracting with the employee to
arbitrate, in order to make room in the limited group of designated
employees for another employee whom the employer views as more
critical. The employer's revocation of the exempt designation would
void the employer's right to enforce any existing predispute
employment arbitration agreement between the employer and the
employee.
IV. EXEMPTING SMALL EMPLOYERS FROM LEGISLATION INVALIDATING
PREDISPUTE EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
A. The Merits of Distinguishing Between Employers on the Basis ofFirm 
Size
Congress has repeatedly evidenced its concern regarding the impact
of the compliance costs of employment statutes on small businesses.
Indeed, Title VII ,226 the ADEA,227 the ADA,228 and the FMLA229 all
m Cf. H.R. REP. No. 95-950, at 9 ( 1978) (Con£. Rep.) ("To prevent an employer
from circumventing the law by appointing an employee to a bona fide executive or
high policyrnaking position shortly before retirement in order to permit compulsory
retirement of that employee, the conference agreement provides that the exemption
applies only to those employees who for the 2 years prior to retirement serve in such
capacity.") .  It would be highly unusual (outside of the class action context) for at least
1 0  percent of an employer's employees to sue the employer. Thus, the employer
would have no incentive not to "waste" an exemption designation on a less key
employee if it could make the designation at the time litigation with the employee was
imminent.226 42 U.s.c. § 2000e(b) (2006) (defining "employer" for purposes of Title VII in
part as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year") .  
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 647
exempt certain employers from their coverage based on the employer's
number of employees. These small-employer exemptions are intended
to ease "entry into the market and preserv[e]  the competitive position
of smaller firms. ,, 23o More specifically, these exemptions for small
employers evidence congressional intent "to spare very small firms
from the potentially crushing expense of mastering the intricacies of
the antidiscrimination laws, establishing procedures to assure
compliance, and defending against suits when efforts at compliance
fail. " 231 Similarly, 42 U.s.c. § 1981a provides for compensatory and
punitive damages for intentional violations of Title VII,  the ADA and
section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, subject to caps
graduated according to the size of the employer.232 The FLSA, by
contrast, utilizes a different approach to avoid burdening certain small
employers. It contains an exemption for employing "enterprises"
which have an annual gross sales volume less than $500,000.233 
For several reasons, any prohibition on enforcement of predispute
arbitration agreements as they relate to employment law claims should
exempt relatively smaller employers.234 First, small employers are less
likely than larger employers to enjoy a gross advantage in bargaining
227 29 U.s.c. § 630(b) (2006) (defining "employer" for purposes of ADEA in part
as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year").
228 42 U.s.c. § 1 2l 1 1 (5) (2006) (defining "employer" for the purposes of ADA in
part as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current
or preceding calendar year").
229 29 U.s.c. § 261 1(4)(A)(i) (2006) (defining "employer" for purposes of FMLA 
in part as "any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting
commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year").  
230 See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.s. 440, 447 (2003) .
231 Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1999) .
232 42 U.s.c. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D) (2006).
233 29 U.s.c. § 203(s)( l ) (A)(ii) (2006) (defining enterprise for purposes of FLSA's
coverage as "an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done
is not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level that are
separately stated)").
234 Professor Michael Green has hinted at this approach. See Michael Z. Green,
Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for 
Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 467 n.261 (2000) (commenting that
" [a) lthough it is beyond the scope of this Article, a more practical alternative for 
handling the unique issues for small employers would be a congressional amendment
allowing the special handling of mandatory arbitration for smaller employers").
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648 University oj CaliJornia, Davis [Vol. 43:591
power vis-a-vis their employees. 235 Small employers, therefore, are less
likely to be able to bully their employees into unfair arbitration
agreements that might jeopardize the employees' ability to vindicate
their rights in arbitration.
Second, small employers are less well-positioned, compared to
larger employers, to absorb the costs of litigating employment law
disputes in the public court system.236 These costs include direct
monetary costs such as attorney's fees and expenses incurred relating
to discovery as well as financial and emotional costs arising from the
disruption to the employer'S workplace attendant to protracted
employment litigation.237 With fewer employees, the small employer is
less able to afford to have its employees distracted by or tied up in
litigation. Thus, the consequences of foreclosing the more economical
and speedy arbitration option for small employers are of greater
concern.
Third, small employers are less likely than are larger employers to
enjoy a "repeat player" advantage over their employees in arbitration.
As discussed above, some hypothesize that an employer enjoys an
advantage in arbitration because the employer participates in
arbitration or is thought by arbitrators likely to participate in
arbitration on a more regular basis than the employee.23B The principal
concern is that because the repeat-player employer is likely to engage
an arbitrator again while the employee is not, an arbitrator may favor
the employer in order to gain future business. A small employer,
however, is far more likely to be a one-shot player than is a larger
employer.239 For example, an employer with fifty employees is much
235 Id. at 465 (asserting that "small employers tend to operate on fairly equal
bargaining terms with their employees") .
236 Id. ("The risk-averse small employer does not have the huge coffers to wait out
a long, drawn out piece of litigation or the flexibility to drum up a large fund to pay
defense attorneys while the matter is ongoing."); cf. Yarkon, supra note 60, at 189
n. 1 l9 (hypothesizing with respect to settlement that "smaller companies are likely to
be more risk averse than larger companies that have relatively less at stake in an
individual [employment discrimination] case").  
237 See Green, supra note 234, at 464 (postulating that speed of arbitration might
have special appeal to small employers because of "the peace of mind, certainty, and
lack of an ongoing mental drain on its supervisors and human resource personnel"
that quick resolution to employment dispute might bring).
238 See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
239 Bingham, Adhesive Contracts, supra note 12,  at 255 56 ("A small employer with
relatively few employees is less likely to have repeat business than a large Fortune 500
Company with numerous employees. Large companies are more likely to be the
source of future business for the arbitrators [than are small employers,]  because they
have more employment disputes to arbitrate.").
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 649
less likely to engage in employment arbitration again in the near
future than is an employer with five thousand employees. The small
employer, therefore, is less likely to enjoy a repeat-player advantage
vis-a-vis its employee.
Finally, a statute invalidating predispute employment arbitration
agreements with an exception based on the small size of the employer
will still fully safeguard the public interest function of employment
litigation. Under such legislation, the vast majority of employee
discrimination claims will continue to be litigated in a judiCial forum.
Accordingly, a small employer exception will pose no threat to the
general deterrence, law development, and norm development
functions of employment discrimination litigation.240 
B. How Best to Distinguish Between Employers on the Basis of Firm Size
The availability of the exemption for small employers from a
prohibition on enforcement of predispute employment arbitration
agreements might be based on the employer'S annual gross volume of
sales. As noted above,241 the FLSA has such a dollar value limitation.
Alternatively, the availability of the exemption might be based on the
number of employees the employer employs. Title VII,  the ADA, the
ADEA, and the FMLA all employ this approach to exempting small
employers from the coverage of these statutes.242 A critical
consideration in structuring a means for separating out exempt small
employers is the extent to which the means will minimize litigation
over the exempt status of the employer.
This Article's proposed small-employer exemption is based on the
number of employees the employer employs, along the lines of Title
VII's coverage requirement.243 Additionally, it has a two-tiered
exemption, graduated according to the size of the employer, along the
lines of 42 U.s.c. § 1981a's graduated cap on compensatory and
punitive damages for Title VII ,  ADA, and Rehabilitation Act causes of
240 See Gilmer v. InterstateZJohnson Lane, 500 U.s. 20, 32 ( 199 1 ) ;  Gorman, supra
note 6 1 ,  at 668 69 (dismissing concerns that employment arbitration will retard
development of employment discrimination law given that court decisions will
comprise majority of adversary dispositions of employment discrimination claims) .
241 See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 226-229 and accompanying text.
243 See 42 U.s.c. § 2000e(b) (2006) (defining "employer" for purposes of Title VII
in part as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year"). 
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650 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
action.244 Thus, the smallest employers will be completely exempt
from the statute invalidating predispute employment arbitration
agreements. Slightly larger employers will be subject to the statute but
will not have to litigate the issue of whether any employee whom they
have designated as exempt is a supervisor, according to the test set out
in Part III.B.4 above, so long as the employee is among the highest
paid twenty percent of the employer's employees within seventy-five
miles of the employee's facility.
More specifically, this exemption completely exempts any employer
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has one hundred or
fewer employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.245 It partially
exempts any employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has more than one hundred but fewer than five hundred and one
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. Finally, it provides
that small employers who are partially exempt could irrebuttably
designate up to ten percent of their employees as exempt from the
prohibition provided that any such employee is among the highest
paid twenty percent of the employer's employees within seventy-five
miles of the employee's facility.
This proposal borrows the limiting language Title VII utilizes to
define an employer but raises the requisite number of employees from
fifteen or more employees under Title VII to one hundred or fewer or
five hundred or fewer employees, respectively, for my proposed total
and partial exemptions from a prohibition on enforcement of
predispute employment arbitration agreements. A virtue of borrowing
this language from Title VII is that there is a considerable body of
interpretative case law. Courts have already grappled with issues
relating to this definition, such as "Who may be counted as an
employee?" and "How is the counting done?,, 246 This should minimize
the amount of litigation that the proposed exemption for small
employers might otherwise generate.
Finally, to qualify for either the total or partial exemption for a small
employer, an employer must meet the size requirements at both the
244 See 42 U.s.c. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D) (2006). 
245 This language is similar to the language defining "employer" in Title VII. See id. 
§ 2000e(b) (2006).
246 For a collection of and discussion of cases addressing these and other questions
relating to the larger issue of "Who is an employer?" under Title VII, see BARBARA T.  
U:><OEMAN:>< 1St PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATIO:>< LAw 1470 85 (4th ed.
2007).
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2009] Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers 651
time the employer contracts with its employee to arbitrate and at the
time the employer seeks to enforce the arbitration agreement. The
time of contracting for arbitration is relevant because that is when the
balance of bargaining power between employer and employee matters
most. The time of enforcement is relevant because of the concern with
the purported repeat player advantage that large employers may enjoy
in arbitration.247 
CONCLUSION
Critics of predispute employment arbitration agreements argue that
employment arbitration jeopardizes the ability of employees to
vindicate their substantive employment rights. A principal concern is
that employers' typical bargaining advantage enables them to demand
as a condition of employment that employees contract for an
arbitration process that is designed to favor the employer. Critics also
charge that the characteristics of even a "neutral" employment
arbitration tend to favor the employer. Costs unique to arbitration,
such as the arbitrators' fees, might discourage some employees from
asserting a claim against their employer in arbitration if there is a
possibility that the employee might end up being responsible for such
costs. In addition, the limited discovery typical in arbitration tends to
favor the employer who generally has greater relative access than does
the employee to the information, records, documents, and witnesses
essential to proving or defending an employment law claim. Also,
employers who are repeat-players in arbitration might enj oy certain
advantages in arbitration over one-shot employees.
Critics of employment arbitration also assert that it undermines the
public goals of employment discrimination laws and litigation.
Employment arbitration is less effective than judicial adjudication of
employment claims at deterring employers from engaging in invidious
employment discrimination, given that employment arbitration is
private and does not result in a published reasoned opinion. Further,
because arbitration is private and does not result in binding precedent,
it does not contribute significantly to the development of employment
discrimination law necessary to guide future employer conduct.
Finally, these same features also make employment arbitration a less
effective means to develop and reinforce the public values that
animate our employment discrimination laws.
Even if these criticisms have merit, a total prohibition on
enforcement of predispute employment arbitration agreements is
247 See Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 1 2, at 190.
   
   
     
 
 
   
   
    
  
   
   
   
    
     
 
   
    
  
     
     
   
 
 
  
  
  
   
 
 
  
    
 
   
    
 
   
   
  
 
   
  
  
  
     
 
  
 
    
  
  
   
  
  
  
   
  
  
 
   
   
  
 
    
 
   
 
  
   
   
  
     
   
       
  
 
     
     
 
  
 
  
     
 
  
  
  
    
     
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
   
   
    
  
   
   
  
   
   
     
  
   
    
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
  
 
  
   
 
  
  
  
  
    
   
  
 
   
   
  
  
 
   
 
   
  
  
 
  
    
  
 
  
 
  
 
HeinOnline -- 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 652 2009-2010
 
    
 
     
     
     
      
       
  
        
      
      
      
       
      
      
        
      
    
     
          
        
          
          
     
       
     
              
      
      
          
       
       
          
      
      
       
          
      
          
          
          
           
       
          
         
652 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:591
unwarranted. A weighing of the rationales for and against regulation
of the employment relationship generally, and regulation of
employment arbitration agreements specifically, leads to the
conclusion that any such prohibition should exempt claims by or
against certain high-level employees and claims by or against certain
small employers.
A partial prohibition on enforcement of predispute employment
arbitration agreements, with exceptions for high-level employees and
small employers, allows for the public adjudication of most
employment discrimination claims. Therefore, the partial prohibition
safeguards the general deterrence, law development, and norm
development and reinforcement functions of employment litigation .  
Moreover, high-level employees are likely to have sufficient bargaining
power, sophistication and financial resources to negotiate for a fair
arbitration process and to exercise their rights effectively in such an
arbitration. At the same time, employers should value employment
arbitration the most when the disputant is a high-level employee,
given the increased potential for disruption to the workplace and
disclosure of sensitive information that protracted litigation with such
a key employee might bring. Relatively small employers are especially
in need of the advantages that employment arbitration offers, given
that they are less well-positioned to absorb the costs of protracted
employment litigation in the public court system. Moreover, small
employers are less likely to enjoy a gross bargaining advantage vis-a­
vis their employees so as to be able to coerce employees into an unfair
employment arbitration agreement, and they are less likely to benefit
from any repeat player effect in arbitration.
This Article sets forth a proposal to structure exemptions for certain
high-level employees and small employers from any legislation
invalidating predispute employment arbitration agreements in a
manner that maximizes the likelihood of identifying the entities most
meriting an exemption while minimizing the likelihood of litigation
over who qualifies for an exception. With respect to the exemption for
high-level employees, this Article proposes to allow an employer to
designate as exempt from a prohibition on enforcement of predispute
employment arbitration agreements up to ten percent of its employees,
provided that any designated employee is among the highest paid
twenty percent of the employees employed by the employer within
seventy-five miles of the facility at which the employee is employed.
The proposal presumes that an employer knows best which of its
employees are its key employees but also presumes that only certain
highly compensated employees are likely to have the bargaining power
and sophistication necessary to protect themselves from being coerced
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into an unfair arbitration agreement. The proposal, however, allows
some employees who are designated as exempt to avoid the
designation by demonstrating that they do not meet certain objective
criteria set out in the proposal meant to ensure that the exempt
employee exercised the types of responsibilities that we would expect
a key employee to exercise. With respect to the exemption for small
employers from the prohibition on enforcement of predispute
employment arbitration agreements, the proposal bases complete and
partial exemptions on the number of employees the employer
employs, along the lines of Title VII's coverage requirement. Finally,
although the proposal distinguishes between types of employees and
types of employers, it does not distinguish between types of claims.
Any prohibition on enforcement of predispute employment arbitration
agreements should be complete as to subject matter - it should cover
both statutory discrimination claims and common law claims, as well
as contract claims. A partial prohibition on enforcement of predispute
employment arbitration agreements would be inconsistent with a
central goal of employment arbitration as it would invite dual
litigation of an employee's employment law claims.
The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 is too broad. It fails
to recognize that many of the criticisms of predispute employment
arbitration agreements have less force with respect to high-level
employees and with respect to small employers. It also fails to
appreciate that many of the benefits of employment arbitration are
especially pronounced when high-level employees or small employers
are involved. This Article offers a proposal as an alternative that more
thoughtfully balances the interests of employees and employers with
respect to employment arbitration.
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